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ABSTRACT 
This Article analyzes the international law response to the zero-rating 
conundrum. National debates rage across the globe on whether to permit zero-
rating, which violates net neutrality, as a means of increasing connectivity, 
especially in the developing world. As a rule, these highly contentious discussions 
lack rigor, objectivity, and impact. They are characterized by a clash of dogmas: 
the sanctity of net neutrality principles, on the one hand, versus the imperative to 
close the digital divide or respect free markets, on the other. This Article seeks to 
bridge that dichotomy by invoking the applicable international law framework to 
analyze zero-rating as a limitation on net neutrality understood as a norm of 
human rights, which net neutrality demonstrably is. When viewed in this light, 
the zero-rating conundrum becomes a more tractable conflict of rights—the right 
to impart and receive information freely vs. the right to access the Internet—that 
can be constructively analyzed using the exceptions regime that human rights law 
provides precisely to resolve such conflicts. Under this framework, which legally 
binds almost 80% of the countries in the world, proposed exceptions to net 
neutrality like zero-rating must be examined under specific country conditions. 
These exceptions are assessed using a balancing test of factors, including necessity 
and proportionality, to determine whether, on the whole, freedom of expression 
is advanced or not in that particular context. This approach has the additional 
advantage of being able to accommodate inputs from other fields, like economics 
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and technology policy. In short, understanding how human rights legal norms 
apply to net neutrality and zero-rating in practice should lead to better reasoned 
discourse on both sides of the debate, and thus to better outcomes. 
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
In the aftermath of the ferocious net neutrality debates in the United States, 
which culminated in the Federal Communications Commission’s 2015 Open 
Internet Order,1 attention shifted to similar policy discussions in Europe and 
elsewhere.2 One struggle to protect net neutrality with far-reaching consequences 
is taking place in India, where government regulators in 2015 confronted intense 
social backlash over so-called “zero-rating” plans offered by local mobile 
 
 1.  Rules Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, 80 Fed. Reg. 19,738 (Apr. 13, 
2015) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. pts. 1, 8, 20), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2015-04-
13/pdf/2015-07841.pdf [https://perma.cc/WC5H-P6JH] [hereinafter 2015 Open Internet 
Order]. 
 2.  See, e.g., Quinton O’Reilly, The EU Has Plans for an Open Internet, but What Does 
It Mean?, THE JOURNAL.IE (July 11, 2015, 8:00 PM), http://businessetc.thejournal.ie/open-
internet-europe-2193723-Jul2015 [https://perma.cc/NTY6-SP63]. 
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operators.3 The spark was an Indian telecom joining forces with Facebook in 
early 2015 to roll out Internet.org, the latter’s online platform (now called “Free 
Basics”), with the stated objective of advancing connectivity in the developing 
world. Among other things, Internet.org offered limited access to a bundle of 
select online content and services free of charge.4 Other Internet companies both 
large and small now offer free access to the mobile Internet in scores of 
developing countries around the globe.5 
In recent years, a number of governments including the United States have 
legislated strong net neutrality protections to ensure that freedom of speech and 
expression online are not warped by market forces, or otherwise unfairly curtailed 
by network providers.6 A potential threat to net neutrality is zero-rating, which 
refers to “the practice by service providers of offering their customers a specific set 
of services or applications that are free to use without a data plan, or that do not 
count against existing data caps.”7 Numerous countries are in the process of 
developing regulatory frameworks that will determine if and when restrictions on 
net neutrality, in particular zero-rating, will be permitted.8 But what could be 
wrong with offering limited but free access to the Internet to sectors of a 
population that would most likely not enjoy such connectivity or services 
otherwise? 
 
 3.  See Harichandan Arakali, Amazon, Facebook Square Off over Net Neutrality in India, 
INT’L BUSINESS TIMES (Apr. 17, 2015, 12:57 PM), http://www.ibtimes.com/amazon-facebook-
square-over-net-neutrality-india-1886050 [https://perma.cc/HHH4-4H5S]. 
 4.  Jon Russell, Facebook Takes Internet.org and Its Free Mobile Data Services to India, 
TECHCRUNCH (Feb. 9, 2015), http://techcrunch.com/2015/02/09/internet-org-india 
[https://perma.cc/G7Y8-RXER]; see also ‘Free Basics by Facebook’ Replaces Internet.org 
Website and App, ENGADGET.COM (Sept. 24, 2015), 
http://www.engadget.com/2015/09/24/free-basics-by-facebook [https://perma.cc/9UEY-
FHR5] (stating that “Free Basics” offers a menu of services and applications to users in Asia, 
Africa and Latin America to choose from). 
 5.  See infra Part II.A. 
 6.  See infra notes 228-244 and accompanying text. 
 7.  See, e.g., Open Letter to Mark Zuckerberg Regarding Inernet.org, Net Neutrality, 
Privacy, and Security, FACEBOOK (May 18, 2015, 6:34 AM), 
https://www.facebook.com/notes/accessnoworg/open-letter-to-mark-zuckerberg-regarding-
internetorg-net-neutrality-privacy-and-/935857379791271 [https://perma.cc/DK58-36YX] 
[hereinafter Open Letter]; see also Mitchell Baker, Zero Rating and the Open Internet, LIZARD 
WRANGLING (May 6, 2015), https://blog.lizardwrangler.com/2015/05/06/zero-rating-and-the-
open-internet [https://perma.cc/592T-M6A2]. 
 8.  See, e.g., Net Neutrality: DoT Panel Against Facebook’s Internet.org, Favours Airtel 
Zero, INDIA TODAY (July 6, 2015, 10:13 AM) 
http://indiatoday.intoday.in/technology/story/net-neutrality-facebook-internet.org-airtel-
zero-trai/1/449368.html [https://perma.cc/E4S3-3MA9]; see also Frederico Marini-Balestra & 
Ricardo Termolada, The EU Debate on Net Neutrality: What about Zero Rating?, ACADEMIA 
(2015), 
http://www.academia.edu/15249139/The_EU_debate_on_net_neutrality_What_about_zero-
rating [https://perma.cc/CYH5-EP39]; Patricia Rey, Net Neutrality in Mexico: Still a Long 
Way to Go, BNAMERICAS (Feb. 27, 2015), 
http://www.bnamericas.com/en/news/technology/net-neutrality-in-mexico-it-is-a-long-way-
to-the-top [https://perma.cc/GQK8-QWKR]. 
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Quite a bit, it turns out. Primarily, this is because zero-rating acts as a 
constraint on net neutrality, the principle that network providers—including 
mobile operators—must treat all data and content online equally9 to guarantee the 
free flow of information and unfettered access to it.10 From this perspective, 
‘[z]ero rating’ is [a] discriminatory technique where telecom operators allow 
customers access to select online content or services at no additional cost 
through a prior arrangement with content providers. The selected sites are rated 
at zero cost to the customers, violating the essence of net neutrality, which 
requires non-discrimination between different content and applications.11 
Simply put, given that zero-rating violates net neutrality by definition, the 
controversy is over whether zero-rating should ever be allowed, and if so, 
when.12 This is what I call the zero-rating conundrum. To date the sharpest clash 
involving this conundrum has been in India, where public debates since 2015 have 
garnered significant international attention.13 The roll out of Internet.org in 
February of that year sparked waves of protest from Indian civil society and digital 
rights activists around the world.14 They worried that Facebook, a for-profit 
multi-national corporation, would—through its Internet.org platform—become 
“gatekeeper” to the Internet for millions of mobile phone users in the developing 
world, with nefarious consequences for local innovation, competition, and social 
development.15 
 
 9.  U.N. Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion & Expression, Organization for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe Representative on Freedom of the Media, OAS Special 
Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression & ACHPR Special Rapporteur on Freedom of 
Expression & Access to Information, Joint Declaration on Freedom of Expression on the 
Internet, ORG. FOR SEC. & COOP. IN EUROPE (June 1, 2011), http://www.osce.org/fom/78309 
[https://perma.cc/JPT6-F642] [hereinafter Joint Declaration]; see 2015 Open Internet Order, 
supra note 1, at 1. 
 10.  Open Letter, supra note 7 (“Net neutrality supports freedom of expression and 
equality of opportunity by enabling people to seek, receive and impart information, and to 
interact as equals. It requires that the internet be maintained as an open platform on which 
network providers treat all content, applications and services equally, without discrimination. 
An important aspect of net neutrality states that everyone should be able to innovate without 
permission from anyone or any entity.”). 
 11.  Vipal Kiran Singh, Permit Zero-Rating Schemes for a Limited Period, THE FINANCIAL 
EXPRESS (July 9, 2015, 1:09 AM), http://www.financialexpress.com/article/fe-
columnist/permit-zero-rating-schemes-for-a-limited-period/97559 [https://perma.cc/4F7T-
F87P]. 
 12.  The policy debate surrounding net neutrality in any given country will obviously be 
broader than just whether or not to allow zero-rating. For a detailed discussion of most (if not 
all) relevant considerations in such a debate, see Barbara van Schewick, Network Neutrality and 
Quality of Service: What a Nondiscrimination Rule Should Look Like, 67 STAN. L. REV. 1 
(2015). However, I will be focusing primarily on the key issue of zero-rating for the reasons 
explained in this Introduction. 
 13.  See, e.g., Evgeny Morozov, Facebook Isn’t a Charity. The Poor Will Pay by 
Surrendering Their Data, GUARDIAN (Apr. 25, 2015), 
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/apr/26/facebook-isnt-charity-poor-pay-
by-surrending-their-data?CMP=fb_gu [https://perma.cc/CA98-MVNE]. 
 14.  Id. 
 15.  See infra notes 86-88 and accompanying text. 
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As the backlash to Internet.org began to unfold in India, Facebook CEO Mark 
Zuckerberg responded publicly to critics in both an opinion piece published by an 
Indian online financial paper and through a post on his Facebook page. He stated: 
[S]ome people have criticized the concept of zero-rating that allows Internet.org 
to deliver free basic internet services, saying that offering some services for free 
goes against the spirit of net neutrality. I strongly disagree with this. We fully 
support net neutrality. We want to keep the internet open. Net neutrality 
ensures network operators don’t discriminate by limiting access to services you 
want to use. It’s an essential part of the open internet, and we are fully 
committed to it. But net neutrality is not in conflict with working to get more 
people connected. These two principles—universal connectivity and net 
neutrality—can and must coexist.16 
Commentators were quick to reply that Mr. Zuckerberg “can’t have it both 
ways on net neutrality.”17 A journalist for Wired affirmed bluntly that if the 
question is “whether the Internet.org model runs counter to the core tenets of net 
neutrality, [the] answer [is] obvious.” The two are irreconcilable. On this view, 
the question Mr. Zuckerberg and the proponents of zero-rating should be 
answering instead is “whether the same rules should apply in places where people 
don’t have access to the Internet at all, let alone equal access.”18 The real question 
is whether it is acceptable “to suspend some of the net neutrality absolutism the 
tech community has rallied behind in the US if it serves a greater good in the 
world’s poorest countries . . . .”19 This, too, is an essential dimension of the zero-
rating conundrum. 
By insisting that “universal connectivity” and net neutrality “can and must co-
exist,” Mr. Zuckerberg and Facebook are accused of wanting “to have their cake 
and eat it too.” This adage is meant to convey that the ostensible goal—full respect 
for net neutrality—and the desired outcome—a global connectivity platform based 
on zero-rating—are inherently incompatible. If one subscribes to the “net 
neutrality absolutism” that characterizes certain sectors of the net neutrality 
debates in the United States, then that conclusion is inescapable. But is net 
neutrality as a principle really absolute? The issues reflected in the foregoing 
exchange have far-reaching consequences beyond the borders of any one country 
or region.  
Other Internet companies, telecoms, and governments all over the world 
have kept a close eye on how the regulatory battles over net neutrality have 
 
 16.  Mark Zuckerberg, Internet.org Does Not Violate Net Neutrality, LIVEMINT (Apr. 16, 
2015), http://www.livemint.com/Opinion/vewA4Z6qQ82IuN8yQKIqxK/Mark-Zuckerberg-
on-Net-neutrality.html [https://perma.cc/VZ9Q-ZSME]; Mark Zuckerberg, FACEBOOK 
(Apr. 16, 2015, 10:59 PM), https://www.facebook.com/zuck/posts/10102033678947881 
[https://perma.cc/G6EY-JJMD] (emphasis added). 
 17.  Issie Lapowsky, Mark Zuckerberg Can’t Have It Both Ways on Net Neutrality, 
WIRED (Apr. 17, 2015, 2:08 PM ET), http://www.wired.com/2015/04/internet-org-zero-
rating [https://perma.cc/4ML9-FQQE]. 
 18.  Id. 
 19.  Id. 
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unfolded in India, Europe and elsewhere.20 Ultimately, India’s regulator chose to 
ban differential pricing, including zero-rating by telecoms, in February 2016.21 In 
the United States, the FCC adopted a set of strong net neutrality protections that 
nonetheless leave the door open to zero-rated “sponsored data” plans, provided 
they do not unfairly or unreasonably disadvantage consumer choice and 
expression.22 What that means is anybody’s guess. 
No matter how you look at it, there is a great deal at stake in the zero-rating 
debate. But how you look at it is, in fact, critical to addressing the inherent tension 
between net neutrality and zero-rating in a coherent manner. This Article 
approaches the issue by bringing a “new” perspective to the debate: international 
human rights law. This corpus of norms is itself not new, of course. However, in 
most countries, the polemics surrounding zero-rating and net neutrality 
regulation have been largely devoid of reference to human rights rules. Policy 
debates have focused instead on the social, economic, and technical dimensions of 
zero-rating, as reflected in the still modest but growing body of research and 
commentary on the subject.23 But even as advocates on both sides of the debates 
 
 20.  See, e.g., Telecom Reg. Authority of India [TRAI], Consultation Paper No. 8/2015 
on Differential Pricing for Data Services, at 9 (Dec. 9, 2015), 
http://www.trai.gov.in/WriteReaddata/ConsultationPaper/Document/CP-Differential-
Pricing-09122015.pdf [https://perma.cc/6ZLL-JWHT] [hereinafter “TRAI Consultation 
Paper”]; Kieren McCarthy, Council of Europe Gets Tough on Net Neutrality: No Blocking, 
Slowing Down, Degrading or Discriminating of Internet Traffic, THE REGISTER (Jan. 13, 2016), 
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2016/01/13/council_of_europe_net_neutrality_guidelines 
[https://perma.cc/3MFZ-7M46] [hereinafter Council of Europe Gets Tough on Net 
Neutrality]. Brazil is an example of another front line in this battle. See Francsico Brito Cruz & 
Jonas Coelho Marchesan, Net Neutrality in Brazil: The Debate Continues, INTERNETLAB 
(Feb. 4, 2016), http://www.internetlab.org.br/en/internetlab-reports/net-neutrality-in-brazil 
[https://perma.cc/B497-M4YU]. 
 21.  See Annie Gowen, India Bans Facebook’s ‘Free’ Internet for the Poor, WASHINGTON 
POST (Feb. 8, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/indian-telecom-regulator-bans-
facebooks-free-internet-for-the-poor/2016/02/08/561fc6a7-e87d-429d-ab62-
7cdec43f60ae_story.html [https://perma.cc/2CBQ-V8PB]; Jesse Hempl, India Bans Facebook’s 
Basics App to Support Net Neutrality, WIRED (Feb. 8, 2016, 12:52 PM ET), 
http://www.wired.com/2016/02/facebooks-free-basics-app-is-now-banned-in-india 
[https://perma.cc/9BMY-3PZA]. See also Part V (discussing recent developments in India).  
 22.  See infra notes 228-245 and accompanying text. 
 23.  See, e.g., Internet Governance Forum, Session Report: WS 208: Net Neutrality, Zero-
Rating, and Development (Sept. 3, 2014), 
http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/wks2014/uploads/proposal_attachments/IGF_WS_208_-
_Net_Neutrality,_Zero-Rating,_and_Development_session_report.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/H6HM-5FL6]. Recent studies have begun to fill in the blanks on the lack of 
empirical data. See, e.g., Center for Deliberative Democracy, Increasing Internet Access to the 
Next Billion (2015), http://cddrl.fsi.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/igf-dp-report.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/BG6D-V9FJ] [hereinafter Stanford Study]; see also Carolina Rossini & 
Taylor Moore, Exploring Zero-Rating Challenges: Views from Five Countries (Public 
Knowledge, Working Paper, July 2015), 
https://www.publicknowledge.org/assets/uploads/blog/Final_Paper-Jul_28-TM.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/MD29-Q4MQ] [hereinafter Rossini Public Knowledge Paper]; Chenai Chair, 
Research ICT Africa, Africa Supply Side Assessment of Zero Rating (Nov. 10, 2015), 
http://www.researchictafrica.net/presentations/Presentations/2015_Chair_Zero%20Rating%2
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intensify their research in search of better empirical data, their consideration of 
the normative framework of human rights law remains passing at best. This 
Article seeks to re-frame that perspective and, hopefully, expand it. 
When net neutrality is analyzed as a human rights norm, which it 
demonstrably is, zero-rating issue takes on an entirely new dimension, one that is 
critical to understanding net neutrality’s proper function in the real world. The 
zero-rating conundrum ceases to be cast as a divisive dichotomy of dogmas and 
transforms into something rather more tractable: a conflict of rights, of the type 
that is regularly confronted and resolved within the framework of international 
human rights law.24 When viewed through the lens of human rights, “preserving 
[net] neutrality means preserving the power of individuals to make choices about 
how they use the Internet—what information to seek, receive, and impart, from 
which sources, and through which services.”25 Accordingly, the issue from a 
human rights perspective is this: Can zero-rating ever be consistent with net 
neutrality principles, understood as the freedom enjoyed by all persons to seek, 
receive, and impart information in a nondiscriminatory manner? Because even 
fundamental rights are not absolute, the answer to that question turns out to be 
yes, sometimes, under certain circumstances. 
The remainder of this Article is dedicated to examining net neutrality as a 
human rights norm and the conditions under which that principle can be 
legitimately qualified by proposed restrictions such as zero-rating. It is divided 
into three Parts. Part II surveys the panorama of zero-rating around the world to 
establish a foundation for the legal and policy analyses to follow in Parts III and 
IV, respectively. It first reviews the principal forms that zero-rating has taken and 
offers a working typology to facilitate the discussion of the relevant issues. Part II 
then surveys net neutrality and zero-rating over a range of representative 
 
0presentation_IGF2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/EM6Q-3CHD]; Roslyn Layton & Silvia Elaluf 
Calderwood, Zero Rating: Do Hard Rules Protect or Harm Consumers and Competition? 
Evidence from Chile, Netherlands and Slovenia (Aug. 15, 2015), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2587542 [https://perma.cc/97H7-NJC5] 
[hereinafter Layton & Elaluf-Calderwood]; Pedro Henrique Soares Ramos, Towards a 
Developmental Framework for Net Neutrality: The Rise of Sponsored Data Plans in 
Developing Countries, (Mar. 31, 2014), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2418307 [https://perma.cc/D7L6-HTA7]; 
ALEX SMITH & BEN MOSKOWITZ, MOBILE FOR DEVELOPMENT IMPACT: APPROACHES TO LOCAL 
CONTENT CREATION: REALIZING THE SMARTPHONE OPPORTUNITY (2015), 
https://stuff.webmaker.org/whitepapers/smartphones_content_skills.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/98KS-Y74D] [hereinafter MOZILLA STUDY]; Dhanaraj Thakur, Alliance for 
an Affordable Internet, The Impacts of Emerging Mobile Data Services in Developing 
Countries (Nov. 2015), http://1e8q3q16vyc81g8l3h3md6q5f5e.wpengine.netdna-
cdn.com/wpcontent/uploads/2015/11/MeasuringImpactsofMobileDataServices_ResearchBrief
1.pdf [https://perma.cc/EM6Q-3CHD]. 
 24.  See infra notes 246-331 and accompanying text. 
 25.  CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH., THE IMPORTANCE OF INTERNET NEUTRALITY TO 
PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS ONLINE 5 (2013), https://cdt.org/files/pdfs/internet-neutrality-
human-rights.pdf [https://perma.cc/597U-9M44] [hereinafter CDT REPORT 2013] (emphasis 
added). Network neutrality is also instrumental to preserving media diversity and pluralism on 
the Internet. This is discussed infra in Part III.B.1. 
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countries by region using both quantitative (statistical analysis) and qualitative 
(case study) methods. Part III outlines and analyzes the normative framework 
under international human rights law, focusing primarily on freedom of 
expression and non-discrimination principles. It explores the origins of the net 
neutrality principle to better understand its evolution as well as its relevance as a 
contemporary norm of human rights. Finally, Part IV applies the human rights 
legal framework to zero-rating in light of the preceding data to demonstrate how 
policymakers, advocates, academics and others can utilize this “new perspective” 
to better evaluate the function and impact of zero-rating in context. 
II.   THE PANORAMA: ZERO-RATING AROUND THE WORLD 
This second Part is divided into two subparts. Subpart A scans the global 
panorama of zero-rating. It begins by providing an overview of the various forms 
that zero-rating takes and, where relevant, the principal sponsors of those 
initiatives. This allows for a useful differentiation between the various forms of 
purported zero-rated activities in effect or under study. This first subpart acts as a 
backdrop to the second, which takes a quantitative and qualitative look at the 
conditions under which net neutrality policies are implemented in different 
countries and regions. Subpart B first compiles key statistical indicators for a 
sample of countries selected by region. These indicators paint a picture of each 
country’s economic, social and political development, especially in terms of fixed 
and mobile Internet access. Finally, subpart B discusses the barriers to 
connectivity as they exist in these and other countries before outlining three case 
studies that exemplify the prevailing approaches to zero-rating. 
A.   The Global Panorama: Types and Sponsors of Zero-Rating 
This subpart examines the principal configurations of zero-rating as it 
presently occurs. To recall, we have defined zero-rating as the practice of offering 
free access to certain online services or data for customers of particular mobile 
networks.26 This is generally implemented by exempting traffic to certain sites or 
 
 26.  Matthew Shears, No. 208 Net Neutrality, Zero-Rating & Development: What’s the 
Data?, INTERNET GOVERNANCE FORUM (Sept. 2014), 
http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/wks2014/index.php/proposal/view_public/208 
[https://perma.cc/BH29-SX9S]. It is important to note that this typology does not include 
public service zero-rating, such as some governments employ for purposes of emergency or 
other public services. An example is provided by the regional government of São Paolo state, in 
Brazil, which subsidizes electronic government services through a publicly sponsored zero-
rated platform. See Henrique Medeiros, Poupatempo No Celular: Acesso Patrocinado Custará 
R$ 20 Milhões ao ano para o Estado de SP, TELETIME (Sept. 28, 2015), 
http://convergecom.com.br/teletime/28/09/2015/estado-de-sp-aposta-em-0800-de-dados-
para-economizar-r-20-mi-no-poupatempo [https://perma.cc/9Z64-J39W]; see also 
POUPATEMPO, https://www.poupatempo.sp.gov.br/epoupatempo [https://perma.cc/Z47H-
U4SZ] (the São Paolo regional government e-services website). 
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through select applications from a subscriber’s data caps.27 Additionally, in some 
zero-rating arrangements, users can access the service even if they do not have a 
data plan.28 These types of programs are popular in the mobile market because of 
the high cost of bandwidth compared to wired Internet, coupled with the low or 
non-existent availability of wired connections in many countries.29 The goal of 
this subpart is to present a functional typology of private sector zero-rating 
practices that can facilitate the analyses to follow. 
In this regard, there are at least four models of zero-rating practices: single-
site or service zero-rating, sponsored data, compound zero-rating, and faux (or 
non-selective) zero-rating. These categories are not mutually exclusive: a given 
plan or platform may fit into more than one category depending on its 
characteristics. Each rubric is examined below. 
1.   Single-Site or Service Zero-Rating 
In single-site or service zero-rating, one of the earliest adopted forms of zero-
rating, a content provider contracts with one or more telecoms to provide users 
with free access to a version of its particular site or service free of charge. 
Generally, the zero-rated content can either be exempted from a customer’s data 
plan “cap” or accessed wholly apart from any data plan. Unlike sponsored data 
plans (discussed below), single-site or single-service plans may not involve the 
content providers paying the telecom for the customer’s zero-rated data usage, 
though they can. Such sites can be offered as a non-profit public interest service, 
e.g. Wikipedia Zero, or as a gateway to the greater Internet, where additional sites 
are accessible for a fee, e.g., Google Free Zone. Another example of a single-
service application that telecoms zero-rate in a number of countries as a 
marketing strategy is WhatsApp, the world’s most popular messaging app.30 
Telecom service providers benefit from these arrangements by catering to users 
who wish to utilize the free sites or services (and through payments from content 
 
 27.  Shears, supra note 26. 
 28.  Id. Users generally are required to provide some personal data to subscribe to the 
zero-rated service or website, so in that sense they are not completely “free.”  
 29.  Antonios Drossos, Forget Fast Lanes. The Real Threat for Net-Neutrality Is Zero-
Rated Content, GIGAOM (Apr. 26, 2014, 10:30 AM PDT), 
https://gigaom.com/2014/04/26/forget-fast-lanes-the-real-threat-for-net-neutrality-is-zero-
rated-mobile-traffic [https://perma.cc/J6TW-ZLJB]; see David Talbot, Around the World, Net 
Neutrality Is Not a Reality, MIT TECH. REV. (Jan. 20, 2014), 
http://www.technologyreview.com/news/523736/around-the-world-net-neutrality-is-not-a-
reality [https://perma.cc/6T85-PVWQ] (noting that many users do not have easy access to 
Wifi and no traditional connections at home). 
30. How Popular Is WhatsApp Around the World?, WHATSAPP 4, 
http://www.whatsappfor.org/facts/popular-whatsapp-world [https://perma.cc/R5K4-RQGJ]. 
Various telecoms zero-rate WhatsApp as a marketing strategy in Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico 
and Brazil. See KARISMA FOUNDATION, ¿CÓMO SE CONTRATA EN LATINOAMÉRICA EL ACCESO A 
INTERNET? ¿QUÉ TIENE QUE VER ESTO CON LA NEUTRALIDAD DE LA RED? 29, 34 (2016), 
https://karisma.org.co/ofertas-de-acceso-a-internet-en-america-latina 
[https://perma.cc/XBA7-EXLM]; Rossini Public Knowledge Paper, supra note 23, at 39-40. 
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providers where they exist) and incentivizing them to pay for data packages or 
complementary data usage. 
The best-known examples of single-site zero-rating are Wikipedia Zero, 
Google Free Zone, and Facebook Zero, though there are important differences 
between them. Wikipedia Zero is a charitable initiative by the Wikimedia 
Foundation that partners with mobile operators to provide free access to 
Wikipedia to everyone.31 Its stated goal is to “empower people around the world 
to develop and share freely licensed educational content.”32 It is currently available 
in 57 countries where it zero-rates access to its specially enabled websites through 
75 different operators, reaching an estimated 600 million people.33 Unique among 
zero-rating programs, Wikipedia Zero is publicly committed to providing 
transparency and accountability via ten operating principles.34 These include: (1) 
carriers must zero-rate access to all parts of Wikipedia, and may not only zero-
rate a portion of the site; (2) carriers must ensure that users do not mistakenly 
incur data charges and that users are prompted with a notice if they are about to 
leave a zero-rated page; (3) there will be no exchange of payment between 
Wikipedia Zero and the mobile carrier for providing the zero-rated services; and 
(4) there are no exclusive contracts—one carrier signing on with Wikipedia Zero 
does not prevent other carriers from doing the same.35 
Google offers another single-site zero-rating type plan. Google Free Zone is 
an initiative that grants customers free access to Gmail, Google Search, and 
Google+, the company’s social networking service.36 Customers are able to freely 
access Gmail and Google+ from their mobile phones, but advanced functionality 
like downloading email attachments requires a data plan.37 Additionally, 
customers can search Google through their phones without incurring data 
charges.38 The Google Search functionality allows users to access any of the 
 
 31.  Mobile Partnerships, THE WIKIMEDIA FOUNDATION, 
http://wikimediafoundation.org/wiki/Mobile_partnerships [https://perma.cc/NF65-C8HR] 
(Mar. 30, 2016); Wikipedia Zero, THE WIKIMEDIA FOUNDATION, 
http://wikimediafoundation.org/wiki/Wikipedia_Zero [https://perma.cc/4HZX-MJBS] 
(Apr. 3, 2015). 
 32.  Wikipedia Zero Operating Principles, THE WIKIMEDIA FOUNDATION, 
http://wikimediafoundation.org/wiki/Wikipedia_Zero_Operating_Principles 
[https://perma.cc/D4XG-9CZQ] (Apr. 3, 2015). 
 33.  Wikipedia Zero, supra note 31. See also Mobile Partnerships, supra note 31 (listing 
host countries and mobile partnerships). 
 34.  See Wikipedia Zero Operating Principles, supra note 32. 
 35.  Id. 
 36.  Press Trust of India, Airtel Ties up with Google to Offer Free Search, Google+ and 
Gmail Services, GADGENTS360 (June 26, 2013), http://gadgets.ndtv.com/telecom/news/airtel-
ties-up-with-google-to-offer-free-search-google-and-gmail-services-384506 
[https://perma.cc/EW4A-TUQ5]. Google Free Zone is offered in the Philippines, Sri Lanka, 
India, Thailand, Nigeria and Kenya. See Reduce Data Usage on Android, iOS and Desktop, SO 
INTO TECH (Nov. 16, 2014), https://sointotech.wordpress.com/2014/11/16/reduce-data-usage-
android-ios-desktop [https://perma.cc/FQ4X-ZYR3]. 
 37.  Press Trust of India, supra note 36. 
 38.  Id. 
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websites listed on the first page of Google Search results, free of charge.39 If users 
want to access websites not included in Google’s results, they are required to 
purchase a data plan.40 Because Google Free Zone is effectively zero-rating access 
to some external content that is accessed through its search engine results, it can 
be viewed as having some characteristics of the compound zero-rating plans 
discussed below.41 
Facebook Zero—not to be confused with Facebook’s Internet.org 
initiative42—is a plan designed to allow users to access a limited version of 
Facebook on the Internet through their mobile device at any time, free of 
charge.43 Smart phones and feature phones can access it on the web or through a 
popular app; on non-smartphones, for which it is optimized, Facebook Zero 
presents the user with a streamlined, text-only version of the social media site.44 
Launched in May 2010, Facebook partnered with more than fifty telecom 
operators to provide free access to Facebook Zero in forty-five countries.45 
Facebook does not pay its telecom partners to provide the service; nor does it use 
advertising.46 Facebook Zero is made available to customers who have a data plan 
with one of the partnering telecom service providers.47 If users want to access 
photos or follow external links, they receive a notification that they will be 
incurring data changes by doing so.48 There is evidence that many eventually do 
so.49 Additionally, people who access Facebook Zero are likely to invite their 
friends to do so as well, attracting new customers for the telecom provider.50 
 
 39.  Id. 
 40.  Id. 
 41.  Nathaniel Mott, Google Debuts Free Zone to Challenge Facebook for Dominance in 
Developing Countries, PANDO (Nov. 8, 2012), https://pando.com/2012/11/08/google-debuts-
free-zone-to-challenge-facebook-for-dominance-in-developing-countries 
[https://perma.cc/4GQ5-JP4E]. 
 42.  See infra notes 82-89 and accompanying text. 
 43.  Robin Wauters, Facebook Launches Zero, A Text Only Mobile Site for Carriers, 
TECHCRUNCH (Feb. 6, 2010), https://techcrunch.com/2010/02/16/facebook-launches-zero-a-
text-only-mobile-site-for-carriers [perma.cc/KJ27-MZ5Q]. 
 44.  Christopher Mims, Facebook’s Plan to Find Its Next Billion Users: Convince Them 
the Internet and Facebook Are the Same, QUARTZ (Sept. 24, 2012), 
http://qz.com/5180/facebooks-plan-to-find-its-next-billion-users-convince-them-the-
internet-and-facebook-are-the-same [https://perma.cc/Y4UF-RE23].  
 45.  Id. 
 46.  Id. 
 47.  See Wauters, supra note 43. 
 48.  Id. 
 49.  One Year in: Internet.org Free Basic Services, INTERNET.ORG (July 27, 
2015), https://internet.org/press/one-year-in-internet-dot-org-free-basic-services 
[https://perma.cc/S5WW-CSRB] [hereinafter One Year In]; MOZILLA STUDY, supra note 23, at 
12; Stanford Study, supra note 23, at 5; Darrell M. West, Digital Divide: Improving Internet 
Access in the Developing World Through Affordable Services and Diverse Content 2, 10-11 
(Feb. 2015) 
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2015/02/13%20digital%20divide%2
0developing%20world%20west/west_internet%20access [https://perma.cc/SM2D-AMKN]. 
 50.  See Wauters, supra note 43. 
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When compared with other forms of zero-rating, sponsored data and pure 
zero-rating in particular, these single-site or service plans have been relatively 
uncontroversial. Even so, both Google and Facebook have been criticized for 
acting as the “gatekeepers” to the Internet for the millions of users who access it 
exclusively through their zero-rated sites.51 Nor does it help their case that in 
many parts of the developing world, single-site plans like Facebook Zero have led 
to startling misperceptions in the minds of millions of users about what the 
Internet is and is not.52 In direct response to Facebook and Wikipedia’s single-
service plans, Chile became the first country to adopt net neutrality regulations 
prohibiting the plans outright,53 although it later backtracked on Wikipedia 
Zero.54 Aside from violating net neutrality principles, these single-site plans in 
Chile were criticized as representing “bubbles created by companies like Google 
and Facebook to make sure their products become synonymous with ‘the Internet’ 
in consumers’ minds.”55 
2.   Sponsored Data 
In this model, content providers contract with and pay a telecom service 
provider to offer a range of information or services at no cost to users. The best-
known example may be AT&T’s Sponsored Data service. Launched in January 
2014, AT&T’s program allows advertisers to sponsor mobile data for their 
subscribers.56 Such sponsorship also includes allowing companies to sponsor 
“business-related data usage for [their] employees, or sponsor data as part of a 
customer loyalty program.”57 Similar sponsored data plans are being promoted by 
 
 51.  Mott, supra note 41. 
 52.  Leo Mirani, Millions of Facebook Users Have No Idea They’re Using the Internet, 
QUARTZ (Feb. 9, 2015), http://qz.com/333313/milliions-of-facebook-users-have-no-idea-
theyre-using-the-internet [https://perma.cc/69EF-4RVW]. Out of 699 respondents in Nigeria 
and Indonesia using Facebook Zero, nearly 10 percent (68) said they did not use the Internet. Id. 
 53.  Lauren Walker, How Is Net Neutrality Working for the Countries That Have It?, 
NEWSWEEK (Sept. 10, 2014, 4:00 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/how-net-neutrality-
working-countries-have-it-269632 [https://perma.cc/VT5N-SZ3A]. See also infra notes 202-
223 and accompanying text. 
54. Rossini Public Knowledge Paper, supra note 23, at 19. 
55. Nathaniel Mott, Chile Should Be Commended for Taking away Facebook and 
Wikipedia, PANDO (May 30, 2014), https://pando.com/2014/05/30/chile-should-be-
commended-for-taking-away-facebook-and-wikipedia [https://perma.cc/P3V6-8PTT]. 
 56.  Mark Bergen, Net Neutrality Likely to Permit Sponsored Data Plans, 
ADVERTISINGAGE (Feb. 12, 2015), http://adage.com/article/digital/net-neutrality-policy-
permit-sponsored-data/297071 [https://perma.cc/7YCD-KPXE]. Sponsored data can take most 
any form, including advertising, games, commercial apps, or content. See Strategy Analytics, 
Sponsored Data Not Hurt by Net Neutrality, Benefits Consumers Says Strategy Analytics, PR 
NEWSWIRE (Mar. 11, 2015, 8:00 AM), http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/sponsored-
data-not-hurt-by-net-neutrality-benefits-consumers-says-strategy-analytics-300048300.html 
[https://perma.cc/9FUT-ETCW]. 
 57.  Russell Brandom, Sponsored Data: AT&T Will Now Let Companies Buy out Your 
Data Charges for Specific Videos and Apps, THE VERGE (Jan. 6, 2014, 12:00 PM), 
http://www.theverge.com/2014/1/6/5279894/at-t-announces-net-neutrality-baiting-
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telecoms in other countries as well. In 2015 an Indian telecom, Bharti Airtel, 
launched a platform of zero-rated services, Airtel Zero, to some controversy.58 
This platform offered subscribers access to a range of sites and local services 
whose providers paid Airtel to be included.59 Alternatively, the telecom company 
itself might sponsor (or exempt from data charges) a defined set of sites or 
services in order to enhance its competitiveness in relation to rival telecom 
providers.60 T-Mobile’s free music service is an example of this type of company 
“self-sponsored” data plan. Its “Music Freedom” arrangement enables subscribers 
to access music streaming services like Pandora, iTunes Radio, and Spotify, 
without counting it against the users’ data usage caps.61 In other words, T-Mobile 
itself exempts the selected content usage from its data charges and thus “pays” for 
the music streaming by customers.62 
Sponsored data plans are popular among telecom service providers for a 
reason. Regardless of which version of the model a telecom adopts, it benefits not 
just from the payments received from content providers (unless the telecom is the 
sponsoring entity), but also by giving users the opportunity to access free data or 
services on their network, making it more attractive to actual and potential 
subscribers. The content providers, of course, benefit by increasing their exposure 
to potential new customers and collecting some personal data from users. 
Sponsored data plans are similar to single-site plans because some may involve a 
particular content provider making payments to the telecom to offer its site, 
information, or services free to customers. Arrangements where Facebook Zero, 
or Google Free Zone paid their telecom partners to exempt access to their 
respective content and services from data charges would also fall into this 
category. 
Sponsored data plans have been criticized on a number of grounds. Digital 
rights advocates have condemned AT&T’s Sponsored Data service as a 
transgression of net neutrality principles because it treats different sources of 
content differently.63 On purely economic and competition grounds, sponsored 
data “giv[es] companies with more resources and . . . capital to spend on 
advertising an upper hand,” while disadvantaging start-ups and entrepreneurs 
who cannot afford to pay telecoms to make their content available to consumers 
 
sponsored-data-mobile-plans [https://perma.cc/LJ4N-ZBBM]. 
 58.  CEO Defends Airtel Zero Despite Backlash, TIMES OF INDIA (Apr. 18, 2015, 1:21 AM 
IST), http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/tech/tech-news/CEO-defends-Airtel-Zero-despite-
backlash/articleshow/46964010.cms [https://perma.cc/7E7N-NQ7W]. 
 59.  Id. 
 60.  Data Caps, PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE, https://www.publicknowledge.org/issues/data-caps 
[https://perma.cc/SA4J-4V2D]. 
 61.  Adam Levy, T-Mobile Music Freedom Is Ultimately Bad for Consumers, THE 
MOTLEY FOOL (June 26, 2014), http://www.fool.com/investing/general/2014/06/26/t-
mobiles-music-freedom-is-ultimately-bad-for-cons.aspx [https://perma.cc/N9TP-W9VP]. 
 62.  Id. 
 63.  Sam Becker, Here’s Why No One Is Buying into AT&T’s Sponsored Data Plan, THE 
CHEATSHEET (July 29, 2014), http://www.cheatsheet.com/business/heres-why-no-one-is-
buying-into-atts-sponsored-data-plan.html [https://perma.cc/U948-T97K]. 
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for free.64 Airtel Zero was criticized on the same grounds.65 T-Mobile’s “Music 
Freedom” falls into this category too, because it does not support every music 
streaming service, and thus can be perceived as prioritizing certain sources of 
online (music) content on its network at the expense of others.66 
Proponents of sponsored data respond that so long as the service pricing is 
reasonable with equal access for all companies wishing to participate, there is no 
harmful discrimination or prejudice to consumers, only benefit.67 On this view, 
non-discriminatory access to purchasing sponsored data reflects no anti-
competitive or unfair behavior because everyone is treated equally; this “no harm, 
no foul” approach leads to the conclusion that there would be no meaningful 
violation of net neutrality under such circumstances.68 Supporters in the United 
States and India have likened sponsored data plans to the “toll free” or “1-800” 
dialing approved by the FCC, whereby the public interest is served by companies 
paying for charges rather than the consumer.69 
3.   Compound Zero-Rating 
Compound zero-rating plans are those in which a sponsoring company (or 
companies) partners with a telecom service provider to grant subscribers access to 
a bundle of selected sites and services. Generally, these zero-rated platforms 
provide free access to a wide range of local and other select content as determined 
by the sponsoring companies, often in consultation with government 
 
 64.  Id. 
 65.  CEO Defends Airtel Zero, supra note 58. 
 66.  See, e.g., Mike Masnick, Music Freedom or Holding Consumers Hostage? Letting 
ISPs Pick Winners and Losers Is a Problem, TECHDIRT (June 19, 2014, 10:03 AM), 
https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20140619/06354227623/when-your-internet-access-
provider-gets-to-pick-winners-losers-theres-problem.shtml  
[https://perma.cc/A8AR-KPNV]. 
 67.  See, e.g., Airtel Launches ‘Airtel Zero’: A Win-Win Platform for Customers and 
Marketers, AIRTEL (Apr. 6, 2015), http://www.airtel.in/about-bharti/media-centre/bharti-
airtel-news/corporate/airtel+launches+-+airtel+zero-+a+win-
win+platform+for+customers+and+marketers [https://perma.cc/NQ3K-9KV7]; Steve 
Anderson, Airtel Unveils Sponsored Data Services, NEXT GENERATION DIGITAL SERVICES 
(Apr. 7, 2015), 
http://www.nextgenerationdigitalservices.com/topics/nextgenerationdigitalservices/articles/4
01131-airtel-unveils-sponsored-data-services.htm [https://perma.cc/FAV6-SUBJ]. 
 68.  CEO Defends Airtel Zero, supra note 58.  
 69.  See AT&T Introduces Sponsored Data for Mobile Data Subscribers and Business, 
AT&T (Jan. 6, 2014), http://www.att.com/gen/press-
room?pid=25183&cdvn=news&newsarticleid=37366&mapcode [https://perma.cc/ERD7-
SKZ8]; Karl Bode, Despite Limited Interest in AT&T’s Sponsored Data, Company Still “Bullish” 
on Its Awful Precedent, WIRELESS (Feb. 5, 2015, 1:37 PM), 
https://www.techdirt.com/blog/wireless/articles/20150106/12150529611/despite-limited-
interest-ats-sponsored-data-company-still-bullish-its-awful-precedent.shtml 
[https://perma.cc/NU8Y-FFFE] (“To hear AT&T pitch it at the time, this would be akin to 
‘free shipping’ or a 1-800 number for data . . . .”); CEO Defends Airtel Zero, supra note 58. 
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authorities.70 Accordingly, these plans are more like a platform of curated 
offerings accessed through a subscriber’s mobile phone. Unlike sponsored data 
services, they do not require payments to or by the telecoms, which can forego 
such fees in exchange for enhanced offerings to customers and an increased 
subscriber base.71 Telecoms benefit by attracting new users who might not 
otherwise be able to (or want to) pay for a data plan and online access. The 
content providers and telecoms can claim both to be offering a service and 
creating new market opportunities for users to access additional data or services 
for a fee.72 Despite their apparent utility, these plans are among the most 
controversial type of zero-rating to date for a variety of reasons discussed below. 
As mentioned above, Google Free Zone has attributes of both a single-service 
and a compound zero-rating plan.73 Airtel Zero in India combined features of 
sponsored data and compound zero-rating before it was shut down by the Indian 
regulator’s decision to ban all differential pricing by telecoms, including zero-
rating.74 But Facebook’s original Internet.org, now part of the Free Basics 
connectivity platform, is an unalloyed example of a compound zero-rating plan.75  
Founded in August 2013, Internet.org seeks to close the digital divide by 
providing entire populations in less developed countries with affordable access to 
 
 70.  For example, Mark Zuckerberg and President Juan Manuel Santos of Colombia 
launched Internet.org in Bogota. Internet.org App Launches in Colombia, INTERNET.ORG 
(Jan. 14, 2015), https://internet.org/press/internet-dot-org-app-launches-in-colombia 
[https://perma.cc/9K62-QMQT]; see also Anderson Antunes, Mark Zuckerberg Meets with 
Brazil’s President at the 7th Summit of the Americas, in Panama, FORBES (Apr. 11, 2015, 
12:40 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/andersonantunes/2015/04/11/mark-zuckerberg-
meets-with-brazils-president-at-the-7th-summit-of-the-americas-in-panama/#2d8672e18789 
[https://perma.cc/CWG8-LD6L]; Josh Constine, Indian Prime Minister Tells Zuckerberg 
Social Media Creates a New Form of Diplomacy, TECHCRUNCH (Sept. 27, 2015), 
http://techcrunch.com/2015/09/27/modiberg [https://perma.cc/6Y9K-2NGL]. 
 71.  David Post, Facebook, Internet.org, and the Net Neutrality Bugaboo, WASHINGTON 
POST (Aug. 17, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-
conspiracy/wp/2015/08/17/facebook-internet-org-and-the-net-neutrality-bugaboo 
[https://perma.cc/SV34-UQRE]. 
 72.  There is evidence that this business model works. Facebook reports that “more than 
half of the people who come online through Internet.org are paying for data and accessing the 
internet within the first 30 days.” One Year in, supra note 49. See also Anna Peel, Facebook: 
More People Are Online Thanks to Internet.org, VALUE WALK (July 27, 2015, 12:00 PM), 
http://www.valuewalk.com/2015/07/facebook-more-people-are-online-thanks-to-internet-
org [https://perma.cc/58AP-J4EU] (quoting Facebook VP Chris Daniels as saying that users 
who join Internet.org subsequently “want to move on and experience more Internet”). 
 73.  See supra notes 36-41 and accompanying text. 
 74.  See Press Release No. 13/2016, Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (Feb. 8, 2016), 
http://trai.gov.in/WriteReadData/PressRealease/Document/Press_Release_No_13%20.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/4WQ5-N5H5]; see also supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text.  
 75.  Josh Constine, Internet.Org’s App with Free Access to Facebook, Google, Wikipedia, 
Local Info Launches in Zambia, TECHCRUNCH (July 31, 2014), 
http://techcrunch.com/2014/07/31/internet-org-app [https://perma.cc/89BV-ZGJN]; Mirani, 
supra note 52; Update to Internet.org Free Basic Services, INTERNET.ORG (Sept. 24, 2015), 
https://press.internet.org/2015/09/24/update-to-internet-org-free-basic-services 
[https://perma.cc/2SCT-Z2RT]. 
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dozens of services on the Internet without charge, with wider access provided for 
a fee.76 It is an “initiative bringing together technology leaders, nonprofits and 
local communities to connect the two thirds [sic] of the world that doesn’t have 
[I]nternet access.”77 For example, among the free sites and services that 
Internet.org offered in India before it was shut down were Facebook, Messenger, 
BBC World News, Bing Search, and Wikipedia. In addition, it gave access to 
other home-grown sites that provided local weather, area and sporting news, 
classified ads for employment, information on health, maternal and child care, and 
even music.78 To date Facebook has partnered with Airtel, Ericsson, and Nokia, 
among others, in this endeavor.79 Currently, Internet.org is available to over a 
billion people in at least forty-two nations in Africa, Asia, and Latin America.80 
Those countries include Bangladesh, Colombia, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Kenya, 
Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, the Philippines, Senegal, South Africa, and Zambia81 
Facebook’s stated mission for the Internet.org/Free Basics platform is to 
bring connectivity to the part of the world’s population that still lacks it.82 Many 
question the altruistic justification for this initiative, claiming that it is at bottom a 
market-expansion tactic.83 For example, the rolling out of Internet.org in India in 
 
 76.  Who We Are, INTERNET.ORG, https://internet.org/about [https://perma.cc/VZL7-
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 77.  Id. 
 78.  Rishi Alwani, Facebook’s Internet.org Comes to India: Everything You Need to 
Know, NDTV GADGETS (Feb. 11, 2015), http://gadgets.ndtv.com/internet/features/facebooks-
internetorg-comes-to-india-everything-you-need-to-know-659505 [https://perma.cc/N28Y-
656P]. See also Internet.org App Now Available in India, INTERNET.ORG (Feb. 10, 2015), 
https://internet.org/press/internet-dot-org-app-now-available-in-india 
[https://perma.cc/2349-UXXP]. Internet.org does not give users access to an email service. The 
Internet.org offerings vary from country to country, and most are not as extensive as those that 
were available in India. This is the case, for instance, in Zambia and Colombia. Internet.org App 
Launches in Colombia, INTERNET.ORG (Jan. 14, 2015), 
https://press.internet.org/2015/01/14/internet-org-app-launches-in-colombia 
[https://perma.cc/Z3MM-L8PT]; Guy Rosen, Introducing the Internet.org App, INTERNET.ORG 
(Jul. 31, 2014), https://press.internet.org/2014/07/31/introducing-the-internet-org-app 
[https://perma.cc/W8SN-ZWKB]. 
 79. See Ingrid Lunden, Facebook-Led Internet.org Partners with Nokia on SocialEDU in 
Rwanda, Unilever in India, Ericsson on New Lab to Connect Developing Economies, 
TECHCRUNCH (Feb. 24, 2014), https://techcrunch.com/2014/02/24/facebook-led-internet-org-
partners-with-nokia-on-socialedu-in-rwanda-unilever-in-india-ericsson-on-new-lab-to-
connect-developing-economies [https://perma.cc/MRQ3-9V3Q]. 
 80.  See Seema Sirohi, Sorry Mark Zuckerberg, the World Bank Also Disagrees with You, 
ECON. TIMES: LETTER FROM WASHINGTON (Jan. 16, 2016, 1:58 AM IST), 
http://blogs.economictimes.indiatimes.com/letterfromwashington/sorry-mark-zuckerberg-
the-world-bank-also-disagrees-with-you [https://perma.cc/E3SD-W8RH]. 
 81.  Where We’ve Launched, INTERNET.ORG, https://info.internet.org/en/story/where-
weve-launched [https://perma.cc/F3XX-L5Q8]. 
 82.  See id.; see also Announcing the Internet.org Platform, FACEBOOK NEWSROOM 
(May 4, 2015), http://newsroom.fb.com/news/2015/05/announcing-the-internet-org-platform 
[https://perma.cc/FS8D-5AMY]. 
 83.  See, e.g., Asif Imtiaz, Nothing Altruistic About Facebook’s Initiative to Spread the 
Internet, U.S. FIN. POST (Jan. 6, 2014), http://usfinancepost.com/nothing-altruistic-about-
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February 2015 sparked a wave of protest from digital rights activists around the 
world concerned with protecting net neutrality, freedom of expression, and 
privacy.84 In a coordinated response to the public defense of Internet.org by Mark 
Zuckerberg,85 dozens of global and national advocacy groups including Access, 
Bits of Freedom, and the Center for Media Justice took issue with Facebook’s 
concept of net neutrality, claiming that it was not based on a “true” definition of 
the term.86 They expressed concern “that access for impoverished people [was 
being] construed as justification for violations of net neutrality.”87 In their view, 
because the zero-rating underpinning Internet.org is “inherently discriminatory,” 
it not only violates net neutrality but also “endangers freedom of expression and 
equality of opportunity by letting service providers decide which Internet services 
will be privileged over others, thus interfering with the free flow of information 
and people’s rights vis-a-vis networks.”88 
In response to the criticism that it was acting as a “gatekeeper” by choosing 
certain apps, services, and content over others, thereby creating a “two-tiered” 
Internet for users, Facebook announced in May 2015 that it was opening its 
Internet.org platform generally to “any low-bandwidth online service that meets 
its technical guidelines.”89 
4.   Faux (or Non-Selective) Zero-Rating 
Faux zero-rating plans are those that seem to implicate net neutrality but in 
effect do not. In this model, a content provider partners with one or more telecom 
companies to offer limited amounts of free data to users in exchange for meeting 
certain conditions, such as viewing an advertisement or downloading an 
application. Users are free to use the complementary data as they choose. Because 
neither the content providers nor the telecoms decide what applications, services, 
or sites a subscriber accesses with his or her allotment of free data, faux zero-
rating plans do not raise the discrimination or anti-competitive net neutrality 
concerns that “selective” or “true” zero-rating practices do.90 Strictly speaking, 
 
facebooks-initiative-to-spread-the-internet-11862.html [https://perma.cc/XBH5-XRD9]; 
Shashidhar KJ, Sunil Mittal Calls It Right: What Zuck Is Doing with Internet.org Isn’t 
Philanthropy, MEDIANAMA (Mar. 9, 2015), http://www.medianama.com/2015/03/223-sunil-
mittal-calls-it-right-what-zuck-is-doing-with-internet-org-isnt-philanthropy 
[https://perma.cc/4LDL-AUD5]. 
 84.  See supra notes 3, 14, and accompanying text. 
 85.  See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
 86.  Open Letter, supra note 7. 
 87.  Id. 
 88.  Id. 
 89.  John Ribeiro, Facebook’s Internet.org Opens Platform to Other Online Services, 
COMPUTERWORLD (May 4, 2015, 4:56 AM), 
http://www.computerworld.com/article/2917807/internet/facebooks-internetorg-opens-
platform-to-other-online-services.html [https://perma.cc/4TJ9-8HGV]. 
 90.  See Karl Bode, Mozilla: If Facebook Really Wants to Help Developing Nations, It 
Should Ignore Zero Rating and Fund Real Internet Access, TECHDIRT (May 15, 2015, 6:16 AM), 
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they are not zero-rating at all, if zero-rating is defined as a practice that limits 
consumer choice in accessing the mobile Internet, as it commonly is.91 Telecoms 
and content providers benefit from faux zero-rating plans by attracting new users 
to their brand, and/or to their specific hardware or software, while telecoms also 
benefit from offering customers the opportunity to enhance their data access, all 
without offending net neutrality. 
Mozilla’s so-called “equal-rating” strategies aimed at expanding markets while 
helping to close the digital divide in the developing world are a perfect example.92 
In Mozilla’s view, prevailing practices of “selective” zero-rating are the wrong 
answer to the right question of how best to promote greater connectivity in the 
developing world: 
The correct answer is that all data is transmitted at the same price, whether that 
price is “zero” or anything else. This way, consumers pick the content they 
choose to access based on the quality of that content, not the financial power and 
business partnerships of the provider. This way, new entrepreneurs can still 
reach any and all users on the Internet, even if they are a few people working in a 
co-working space with no ability to subsidize data charges.93 
In furtherance of these strategies, Mozilla announced in May 2015 that it had 
partnered with Orange, a global telecom provider that operates in various African 
and Middle Eastern countries, to offer a low-cost Orange phone using the Firefox 
operating system in thirteen new markets.94 The Klif phone, as it is called, costs 
about $40 and comes pre-loaded with unlimited talk, text, and 500 MB of free data 
per month for six months.95 This initiative presumably built upon Mozilla’s 
experience in Bangladesh, where it has partnered with Grameenphone (owned by 
Telenor) to offer its users 20 MB of free data per day for Internet access if the 
customer first watches an advertisement.96 In Mozilla’s view, “[s]caling up 
arrangements like these could represent a long-term solution to the key 
 
https://www.techdirt.com/blog/netneutrality/articles/20150507/10533030927/mozilla-if-
facebook-really-wants-to-help-developing-nations-it-should-ignore-zero-rating-fund-real-
internet-access.shtml [https://perma.cc/YPE8-FTWJ]. 
 91.  See Mitchell Baker, Zero Rating and the Open Internet, LIZARD WRANGLING: 
MITCHELL ON MOZILLA & MORE (May 6, 2015), 
https://blog.lizardwrangler.com/2015/05/06/zero-rating-and-the-open-internet 
[https://perma.cc/6ZSN-XUYQ] (“Zero-rating as practiced today is ‘selective zero-rating for a 
few apps and websites; exclusion for the rest of the Internet.’”); see also supra note 7 and 
accompanying text. 
 92.  Baker, supra note 91. 
 93.  Id. 
 94.  Denelle Dixon-Thayer, Mozilla View on Zero-Rating, MOZILLA (May 5, 2015), 
https://blog.mozilla.org/netpolicy/2015/05/05/mozilla-view-on-zero-rating 
[https://perma.cc/N7ZB-VTEA]; Firefox OS Proves Flexibility of Web, MOZILLA (Mar. 1, 
2015), https://blog.mozilla.org/blog/2015/03/01/firefox-os-proves-flexibility-of-web-
ecosystem [https://perma.cc/563G-LFCE] (noting that countries where the Klif phone will 
initially be offered are Egypt, Senegal, Tunisia, Cameroon, Botswana, Madagascar, Mali, The 
Ivory Coast, Jordan, Niger, Kenya, Mauritius, and Vanuatu). 
 95.  Dixon-Thayer, supra note 94. 
 96.  Id. 
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underlying problems of digital inclusion and equality” without the negative 
consequences incurred by selective zero-rating practices.97 
Mozilla is not the only company innovating in this field. Since 2014, Jana, a 
Boston-based company, has promoted its mCent app to much acclaim.98 The app 
encourages users to access third-party sites or services free of charge by crediting 
their data plans for doing so.99 Users are thus “awarded airtime for a number of 
different kinds of activities, including downloading and using apps, taking 
surveys, watching videos, signing up for a service, and/or participating in 
contests.”100 The content providers who partner with mCent, such as Twitter and 
Amazon, as well as local music and texting services, pay Jana to make their 
applications available for subscribers to test out through mCent.101 It is projected 
to have upwards of thirty million users in the developing world.102 
Likewise, the India and Silicon Valley-based start-up Marvin employs a 
strategy to reward customers with free data when they access content online 
through Marvin’s application, Gigato. Like mCent, Gigato combines aspects of 
sponsored data and faux zero-rating.103 Its corporate customers pay to have their 
sites and services advertised on a user’s phone through strategically placed content 
and advertisements.104 When a consumer accesses the third-party sites, Gigato 
credits the user’s data plan directly.105 The subscribers can then use the data 
credits to access whatever Internet content they choose. As advertised, “Gigato 
provides free unrestricted Internet data for your Android. Use the apps you love 
and get megabytes recharged to your prepaid account.”106 
B.   National Perspectives on Internet Access and Net Neutrality 
In this subpart we turn our attention to the regional and national contexts in 
which net neutrality policies like zero-rating are implemented. The subpart is 
 
 97.  Id. 
 98.  See Parmy Olson, This App Is Cashing in on Giving the World Free Data, FORBES 
(July 29, 2015, 2:03 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/parmyolson/2015/07/29/jana-mobile-
data-facebook-internet-org [https://perma.cc/S2M3-RRT6]. 
 99.  See Rossini Public Knowledge Paper, supra note 23, at 7.  
 100.  About Us, MCENT (2016), http://mcent.com/about-us [https://perma.cc/256Z-
MRA7]. 
 101.  See Olson, supra note 98. 
 102.  See Alexander Howard, Gigato Tried to Make Internet Access Affordable with Data 
Rebates, HUFFINGTON POST (July 31, 2015, 7:28 PM ET), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/gigato-app-data-rebates_55bbb899e4b0d4f33a02b5ed 
[https://perma.cc/N5JL-X9SC]. 
 103.  Id. 
 104.  See Rossini Public Knowledge Paper, supra note 23; see also Surf More. Save More., 
GIGATO, http://www.gigato.com [https://perma.cc/WZ5T-MA56]. 
 105.  Rossini Public Knowledge Paper, supra note 23. 
 106.  Gigato Application, GOOGLE PLAY (Sept. 29, 2015), 
https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.gigato.market [https://perma.cc/PU6D-
XRDN]. 
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divided into three sections. The first focuses on marshaling key statistical 
indicators for a sample of ten countries organized by region (Africa, Asia, Europe 
and North America, and South America). They were selected using criteria aimed 
at putting together a functional cross-section of global experiences viewed from 
both a quantitative and qualitative perspective. The criteria applied were regional 
representation; policy or practice relating to net neutrality and zero-rating; status 
as a developed country, developing country, or least developed country;107 and 
levels of democratic and Internet freedom. The quantitative indicators selected 
provide a cross-section of each country’s developmental status in social, economic, 
and political terms, and include figures for fixed and mobile Internet coverage. 
Together this data paints a broad but useful panorama of the different domestic 
settings in which zero-rating takes place around the world. The second section 
then shifts to a thematic perspective, looking at the various barriers to Internet 
access as they manifest in countries with low connectivity. The final section aims 
to score a deeper understanding of how zero-rating is being addressed by 
governments in different domestic contexts through three country case studies. 
1.   Background and Context 
There are currently at least sixty states that actively authorize some form of 
zero-rating in practice.108 But there is a growing number that have banned it or 
are in the process of doing so. Notably, the Council of Europe recently adopted 
net neutrality guidelines that could restrict zero-rating throughout Europe,109 
though effective implementation of those protections by member States remains a 
concern.110 In addition, the following countries have or have had laws that either 
 
 107.  For a more detailed description of the typology of country development utilized 
throughout this Article, see infra Table 3 and infra notes 125-127; see also Composition of 
Macro Geographical (Continental) Regions, Geographical Sub-regions, and Selected Economic 
and Other Groupings, U.N. STATISTICS DIV. (Oct. 31, 2013), 
http://unstats.un.org/unsd/methods/m49/m49regin.htm#developed 
[https://perma.cc/9MCQ-738U]. 
 108.  See Are You in the Zone?, GOOGLE FREE ZONE, http://googlefreezone.com (India, 
Nigeria, Philippines, Sri Lanka, and Thailand); Drossos, supra note 29 (United States); Mims, 
supra note 44 (Argentina, Mexico); Facebook Zero, WIKIPEDIA, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Facebook_Zero [https://perma.cc/47LN-SX9L] (Bangladesh, 
Cameroon, El Salvador, Fiji, France, Germany, Greece, Georgia, Guinea, Indonesia, Kosovo, 
Malaysia, Morocco, Myanmar, New Zealand, Pakistan, Panama, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, 
Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, United Kingdom, Zimbabwe); Internet.org, 
WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Internet.org#cite_note-13 [https://perma.cc/T6SP-
EPTD] (Colombia, Ghana, Guatemala, India, Kenya, Philippines, Tanzania, and 
Zambia);Wikipedia Zero, supra note 31. 
 109.  Council of Europe Gets Tough on Net Neutrality, supra note 20 (“The guidelines are 
not legally binding but will almost certainly result in legislation that follows its lead being 
passed across Europe. The council is separate from the European Union, but it is influential, 
being made up of foreign ministers and other politicians from 47 member states.”).  
  110 Tim Berners-Lee, Lawrence Lessig, and Barbara van Schewick, Four Days to Save the 
Open Internet in Europe: An Open Letter, WEB FOUNDATION (July 14, 2016), 
http://webfoundation.org/2016/07/four-days-to-save-the-open-internet-in-europe-an-open-
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do not permit or expressly ban zero-rating practices: Chile, Brazil, Norway, 
Netherlands, Finland, Iceland, India, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Japan, and 
Slovenia.111 Several countries that only discouraged zero-rating in the past now 
prohibit it.112 Significantly, not one of the countries that currently prohibits zero-
rating is located in Africa. Chile, Brazil and now India are the only developing 
nations to ban zero-rating to date, though enforcement is lax and the practice 
continues.113 In order to better understand the profiles of each set of countries—
those that permit zero-rating and those that do not—this section compiles key 
indicators measuring the social, economic, and political conditions in a cross-
section of ten countries from the principal regions of the world. It organizes the 
data into a series of illustrative tables, each organized to highlight critical factors 
in the analyses to follow in subsequent Parts of this Article, as explained below. 
Table 1 summarizes the current status in general terms of the selected 
countries’ efforts to regulate net neutrality and zero-rating, organized by region, 
as follows: 
 
letter [https://perma.cc/6UVQ-7JXU] [hereinafter Berners-Lee Open Letter]; Kari Bode, 
Europe's Flimsy Net Neutrality Rules Go Live, Are Actually Worse than No Rules at All, 
TECHDIRT (May 5, 2016, 3:28 AM), 
https://www.techdirt.com/blog/netneutrality/articles/20160503/09471634331/europes-
flimsy-net-neutrality-rules-go-live-are-actually-worse-than-no-rules-all.shtml 
[https://perma.cc/PWK9-W8VA]. 
 111.  States that banned before India chose to do so in February 2016: Chile, Brazil, 
Norway, Netherlands, Finland, Iceland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Japan, and Slovenia. 
See Romit Guha & Gulveen Aulakh, Zero Rating: What Are Countries Doing About It, TIMES 
OF INDIA (Apr. 21, 2015, 5:51 PM IST), http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/tech/tech-
news/Zero-rating-What-are-countries-doing-about-it/articleshow/47001571.cms 
[https://perma.cc/G6T3-3GLE]; Layton & Elaluf-Calderwood, supra note 23; see also Rossini 
Public Knowledge Paper, supra note 23, at 39 (finding that recently enacted net neutrality 
protections in Brazil do not allow for zero-rating exceptions). 
 112.  For states that discourage zero-rating and where wireless companies do not practice 
it, see David Meyer, Pro-net Neutrality Norway Advises Carriers to Avoid Zero-Rating, 
GIGAOM (Nov. 18, 2014, 4:10 PM PDT), https://gigaom.com/2014/11/18/pro-net-neutrality-
norway-advises-carriers-to-avoid-zero-rating [https://perma.cc/GF4R-95P5] (Norway, 
Finland, Sweden, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Malta, and Iceland—of these countries all but 
Sweden now have laws against zero-rating). 
 113.  See Int’l Telecomm. Union, Country Classifications by Region and Development 
Status, http://www.itu.int/ITU-D/ict/definitions/regions [https://perma.cc/M8GK-RCFF]; 
see also Rossini Public Knowledge Paper, supra note 23, at 16-20 (Chile); 39-46 (Brazil); U. N. 
Statistics Div., supra note 107. For a discussion of the current panorama in India, see infra Part 
V. 
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*Zero-rating is banned by law but tolerated in practice. 
 
Table 2 presents data on fixed and mobile broadband Internet access for these 
same countries. The statistics are ordered to highlight the percentage of fixed 
broadband subscriptions in each country, moving downwards from lowest to 
highest levels of penetration. 
 
 
 114.  See infra Part II.B.2.e. 
 115.  Ken Wieland, Mobile Operators in Slovenia Fall Foul of Net Neutrality Rules, 
MOBILE WORLD LIVE (Jan. 26, 2015), http://www.mobileworldlive.com/mobile-operators-
slovenia-fall-foul-net-neutrality-rules [https://perma.cc/E79K-GY8M]. 
 116.  News Release, Gov’t of Canada, Archived - CRTC Continues to Set the Course for 
the Future of Television with Let’s Talk TV Decisions (Jan. 29, 2015), 
http://news.gc.ca/web/article-en.do?nid=926529 [https://perma.cc/9PWG-KLRC]. 
 117.  See infra Part II.B.2.g. 
 118.  See infra Part II.B.2.a. 
 119.  See infra Part II.B.2.b. 
TABLE 1: NET NEUTRALITY & ZERO-RATING CONTEXT BY REGION 
Country Region Net Neutrality  Zero-Rating  
South Africa Africa Not regulated Permitted Zambia Not regulated Permitted 
India Asia Not regulated Banned Malaysia Not regulated Permitted 
Netherlands 
Europe Regulated by law
114 Banned 
Slovenia Regulated by law115 Banned 
Canada 
North America 
Regulated by administrative agency116 Banned 
United States Regulated by administrative agency117 
Permitted 
in certain 
cases 
Chile South America Regulated by law
118 Banned* 
Colombia Regulated by law119 Permitted 
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Contrasted with the fixed broadband access statistics are those showing 
mobile phone coverage and wireless broadband subscriptions. European and 
North American countries have considerably higher fixed broadband penetration 
than those in other regions (South Korea and Japan being notable exceptions in 
Asia). But the data for mobile cellular coverage are largely comparable across 
regions, with especially high levels (more than 100%) in a number of Asian, 
African and South American States. Notably, South Africa has the highest mobile 
 
 120.  Fixed Broadband Subscriptions (per 100 People), THE WORLD BANK (2016), 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IT.NET.BBND.P2 [https://perma.cc/EH9H-87DL]. 
 121.  See Country Profile, INT’L TELEGRAPH UNION, http://www.itu.int/net4/itu-
d/icteye/CountryProfile.aspx [https://perma.cc/PSV4-PW9H]. 
 122.  Mobile Cellular Subscriptions (per 100 People), THE WORLD BANK (2016), 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IT.CEL.SETS.P2/countries [https://perma.cc/ZF77-
WVZB]. Mobile cellular subscriptions are defined as those that provide voice communication 
access to public mobile telephone service using cellular technology. Id. 
 123.  Internet Users (per 100 People), THE WORLD BANK (2016), 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IT.NET.USER.P2 [https://perma.cc/9Y5B-9NT9]. 
Internet users are defined as people who have access to the worldwide network. Id. 
TABLE 2: FIXED & MOBILE BROADBAND INTERNET ACCESS 
Country Region  
2014 Fixed 
Broadband 
subscriptions 
(per 100 
people)120 
2013 
Mobile 
Broadband 
subscriptio
ns (per 100 
people)121 
2014 
Mobile 
Cellular 
subscripti
ons (per 
100 
people)122 
2014 
Internet 
Users (per 
100 
people)123 
Zambia Africa 0.14 0.7 67 17.3 
India Asia 1.24 3.2 74 18.0 
South 
Africa Africa 3.21 25.2 150 49.0 
Malaysia Asia 10.14 12.5 149 67.5 
Colombia South America 10.27 7.9 113 52.6 
Chile South America 14.08 35.6 133 72.4 
Slovenia Europe 26.55 41.8 112 71.6 
United 
States 
North 
America 30.37 92.8 98 87.4 
Canada No Data **34.38 41.0 83 87.1 
Netherlands No Data  41.02 62.3 116 93.2 
** Canada’s fixed broadband access data was not available for 2014, so the data from 
2013 has been presented in its place. 
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coverage of the ten countries studied, yet the third lowest fixed broadband 
penetration. Also worth highlighting is the substantial difference between mobile 
broadband access, which is still relatively scarce in developing countries, and 
mobile cellular access in those same countries, which, as pointed out already, can 
be very high and on par with their more developed European and North 
American counterparts. It is important to recall here that the zero-rating plans 
described in the prior section are all accessed through cellular (non-smartphone) 
telephones and do not require broadband coverage. 
Table 3 below highlights each country’s gross domestic product (GDP) per 
capita in ascending order from lowest to highest. It contrasts the GDP data with 
each country’s developmental and inequality rankings according to the United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP). Looking at Tables 2 and 3 together, it 
appears—unsurprisingly—that per capita GDP correlates strongly with overall 
Internet usage, and in particular fixed broadband penetration. Interestingly, 
mobile coverage and, to a lesser extent, mobile broadband penetration show little 
correlation with GDP per capita or income inequality; for example, Chile has the 
highest mobile broadband penetration of any of the countries studied outside of 
Europe and North America, despite having a middling GDP per capita and the 
third highest income inequality of the group. 
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TABLE 3: GDP & HUMAN DEVELOPMENT INDEX STATISTICS 
Country 
Adult 
Literacy 
Rate (in 
percent)
124 
2014 GDP 
per 
capita125 
GINI Inequality 
Index126 (0 is 
“perfect equality”; 
100 is “perfect 
inequality”) 
2014 UNDP Human 
Development Index 
Rank (out of 187 
countries) and 
Range Standing127 
Zambia 84 4086.00 55.6  141 (Medium) 
India 69 5,833.30 33.9 135 (Medium) 
South 
Africa 93 13,046.20 63.4 118 (Medium) 
Colombia 94 13,046.40 53.5 98 (High) 
Chile 97 22,333.10 50.5 41 (Very High) 
Malaysia No Data 24,714.80 46.3 62 (High) 
Slovenia 100 29,917.00 25.6 25 (Very High) 
Canada No Data 44,088.50 33.7 8 (Very High) 
Netherlands No Data 47,130.70 28.0  4 (Very High) 
United 
States No Data 54,629.50 41.1 5 (Very High) 
 
Finally, Table 4 reviews several indicators reflecting each country’s levels of 
democracy and political freedom, corruption, and Internet freedom, specifically. 
Generally speaking, the European and North American countries display stronger 
tendencies in these areas than most of the countries from the other regions. It is 
noteworthy that the countries in our study that have banned zero-rating possess 
the highest possible levels of democracy (9 or 10 out of 10). Additionally, most of 
the zero-rating banning countries score well on the Corruption Perception Index, 
with the exception of India and possibly Slovenia. 
 
 124.  Adult Literacy Rate, Population 15+ Years, Both Sexes (%), THE WORLD BANK (2016), 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.ADT.LITR.ZS [https://perma.cc/3ZD6-X26F] 
(reflecting the most recent statistics published by the World Bank: 2009-2013). 
 125.  GDP per Capita, PPP (Current International $), THE WORLD BANK (2016), 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.PP.CD [https://perma.cc/D9W7-JB5A]. 
According to the World Bank, “PPP GDP is gross domestic product converted to international 
dollars using purchasing power parity rates. An international dollar has the same purchasing 
power over GDP as the U.S. dollar has in the United States.” Id. 
 126.  GINI Index, THE WORLD BANK (2016), 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.GINI [https://perma.cc/EPZ6-23TJ] (reflecting 
the most recent statistics published by the World Bank: 2009-2013). 
 127.  Human Development Reports: Table 1: Human Development Index and Its 
Components, U.N. DEV. PROGRAMME: HUMAN DEV. REPORTS (2015), 
http://hdr.undp.org/en/data [https://perma.cc/S5B2-ARFV]. 
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TABLE 4: INDICES ON DEMOCRACY, FREEDOM & CORRUPTION  
Country 
2015 Freedom 
House Index 
(1 is “most 
free”; 7 is 
“least free”)128 
2015 Freedom 
House Internet 
Freedom Score 
(0 is best, 100 
is worst)129 
2014 Polity 
IV 
Democracy 
Index (out of 
10)130 
2014 Corruption 
Perception 
Index131 (0 is 
“highly corrupt”; 
100 is “very 
clean”) 
Malaysia 4 “Partly Free” – 43  6 52 
Colombia 3.5 “Free” – 32 7 37 
Zambia 3.5 “Partly Free” – 40 7 38 
India 2.5 “Partly Free” – 40 9 38 
South Africa 2 “Free” – 27 9 44 
Slovenia 1 NO DATA 10 58 
Chile 1 NO DATA 10 73 
United States 1 “Free” – 19 10 74 
Canada 1 “Free” – 16 10 81 
Netherlands 1 NO DATA 10 83 
2.   Barriers to Connectivity 
No one disputes the persistence of a vast gulf between the world’s population 
that enjoys access to an Internet connection and the population that does not, nor 
the fact that most of that digitally enfranchised population live in developed 
countries. The total number of Internet users has grown rapidly over the past two 
decades to over three billion today, of which nearly eighty percent reside in 
developed countries.132 “[D]eveloping countries [on the other hand] are home to 
about ninety percent of the four billion people not yet using the Internet.”133 So, 
for example, “[w]hile Europe has an Internet penetration rate of over seventy-five 
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percent, only about [twenty percent] of African households are connected.”134 
This is true of other places as well: India and Indonesia, two of the world’s most 
populous nations, have Internet user rates of under twenty percent.135 These 
statistics speak not just to the existence of a digital divide between States, but also 
within them. The technical, political, social, and economic conditions for the 
digital divide globally are merely an aggregation of the causes behind the digital 
divide domestically, which separates the digital “haves” from the “have-nots” 
within a given society. Not surprisingly, then, because developing countries have 
the largest proportions of digitally disenfranchised people, to whom the great 
social, economic, political and cultural benefits offered by an Internet connection 
are not accessible, they are the front lines in the struggle to close both divides.136 
Generally, the barriers to connectivity prevailing in most developing 
countries fall into two types: “hard” and “soft.” Hard barriers are those external 
factors that shape whether technical access to an Internet connection exists or can 
be exercised in a particular society. Examples of such factors are a lack of physical 
infrastructure, the quality of connections to the Internet in places where they 
exist, and the high cost of access in low-income countries.137 Soft barriers, on the 
other hand, are those that limit the personal capacity of potential users or their 
incentives to access an Internet connection where one is available or offered, such 
as education and literacy levels.138 “Hard” and “soft” barriers to connectivity 
combine to perpetuate the digital divide within countries and globally, though 
much more attention is generally paid to hard barriers. 
A number of factors act as hard barriers to increased Internet connectivity in 
developing countries, mostly relating to lack of technical infrastructure, high cost, 
and accessibility. High levels of public and private investment are required to 
create a working wired Internet system, the political and economic conditions for 
which are not commonly present. For example, with few submarine cables leading 
to African countries in general, creating fixed connectivity is expensive, perhaps 
prohibitively so for the poorest States.139 This helps explain why the wired 
broadband access in Zambia is less than one percent of the population; even in 
South Africa, the richest country in Sub-Saharan Africa, barely above three 
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percent of the population is connected in this way.140 This is due to the fact that 
large numbers of the rural population live a long distance from the closest node 
on a fiber network.141 And while a recent increase in submarine cables has helped 
with the spread of the Internet in some parts of the African continent, landlocked 
countries are now forced to rely on a stake in a cable landing station in a 
neighboring country.142 In short, “there is significant evidence that there are 
insufficient cross-border terrestrial connections in Africa, and that those available 
are not fully exploited.”143 
Other regions of the world face similar challenges, keeping fixed Internet 
access at low, even negligible levels. In India, less than two percent of the 
population enjoys wired access; in Malaysia and Colombia, that figure barely 
exceeds ten percent; by contrast, wired subscriptions in developed countries 
surveyed above was closer to a third, on average.144 Part of the problem for 
developing countries resides in extending connectivity to rural areas, which can 
be vast. In China, sixty-three percent of the offline population is rural.145 In India, 
approximately forty-five percent of the rural population live without 
electricity.146 Even where it is available, wired broadband access may be too 
expensive. A monthly broadband subscription costs about sixty dollars in 
Australia and Mozambique.147 However, the average yearly gross income in 
Australia is 50,000 U.S. dollars; in Mozambique, it is less than 500. A broadband 
plan with a speed of 25 to 50 Mbps in Mexico City was 123.73 U.S. dollars on 
average in 2014, while in Amsterdam it was only 43.53 U.S. dollars.148 Yet 
Mexico has a GDP per capita of 10,325.6 and the Netherlands has one of 52,172.2. 
And these figures obviously do not include the related expenses associated with 
wired access of purchasing an Internet-enabled device, such as a personal 
computer or tablet. For these reasons, wired broadband penetration is low to 
negligible in many developing countries, where it is generally reserved for the 
urban and economic elites.149 
The pervasive lack of physical infrastructure, plus the expense of getting 
wired access where it exists, increasingly leads people in developing countries to 
use mobile phones to access the Internet.150 But there are significant obstacles to 
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mobile access too:  
On the infrastructure side, despite clear gains in coverage in recent years [. . .] a 
number of people continue to lack access: 10% of the global population lack 
access to basic voice and text services, and roughly 30% lack access to 3G/4G 
mobile broadband internet. Pertinently, the vast majority of these uncovered 
populations are low income and live in the rural regions of Asia and Sub Saharan 
Africa.151  
Cost continues to be another important barrier.152 Even where mobile access 
is more available than fixed broadband, it is still expensive compared to local 
incomes.153 
On average, mobile broadband costs in developing countries are twice as 
much as those in developed countries.154 In developing countries, people can pay 
“between 8–12 percent of their average monthly income on mobile connectivity, 
and that is often just for voice and text.”155 In Zimbabwe or the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, for example, the average data plan is equivalent to 100% of the 
country’s monthly GNI.156 Similarly, in a place like India, the average person 
would need to work 17 hours to afford a 500MB mobile data plan, in comparison 
to the three hours of minimum wage it would take in the United States to get 
unlimited data for a month.157 In Zambia, the 500MB mobile data plan will cost 
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200 times what a gallon of milk would cost on average.158 Compare this to the 
Netherlands, where a bundle of 500MB and unlimited calls and texts will cost 25 
Euros per month and the minimum wage for a 36-40 hour workweek is 351.85 
euros.159 
In sum, in the context of both wired broadband and mobile phone Internet 
access, high cost is major obstacle for most consumers in the developing world. In 
the case of mobile access, it is arguably the primary one. Most people do not have 
the resources to afford an expensive data plan and pay the fees attached to 
accessing the Internet on a basic or feature phone, much less a pricey 
smartphone.160 Fortunately, smartphones are rapidly becoming more affordable, 
and there is little doubt that they represent the future of mobile connectivity in 
the developing world.161 What may be most surprising, however, is that even 
when people do have access to an Internet connection, they may choose not to use 
it, or be incapable of doing so. These are the soft barriers to access. 
The lack of literacy in different forms is a roadblock to many users. Users 
who lack digital literacy, for example, may experience “unfamiliarity with or 
discomfort in using digital technologies to access and use information.”162 But if a 
potential user is also unable to read and write, connecting to the Internet will be 
that much more difficult.163 Literacy rates in this regard tend to be lower—though 
not always substantially so—in the developing countries surveyed than the 
developed ones.164 Another barrier is relevance: people are less likely to connect 
to the Internet if they do not see or understand its usefulness to them. This arises, 
for instance, where there is insufficient content that appeals to them or relates to 
their day-to-day lives.165 Additionally, businesses in developing countries with 
low levels of mobile connectivity have few incentives to invest in providing 
online services precisely because there are so few Internet-accessing customers.166 
These factors combine to form a status quo of “low connectivity equilibrium” 
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which can be difficult to overcome.167 The proliferation in developing countries 
of mobile phone users in general, and smartphone users in particular, will not be 
as effective in closing digital divides as it could be, unless it is coupled with 
relevant local content offerings, and digital literacy programs aimed at new 
subscribers.168 
3.   Three Approaches to Zero-Rating 
The foregoing discussion uses quantitative data to illustrate the different 
contexts in which net neutrality policies and zero-rating practices take place 
around the world. In this section we focus specifically on three of the countries 
examined above, each reflecting a different approach to zero-rating. The countries 
are Zambia, Chile, and the United States. Each country study integrates the 
economically, politically, and technologically relevant data from the preceding 
section with additional information about how net neutrality in general, and zero-
rating in particular, have been addressed. 
a.   Zambia 
One example of a developing nation that embraces zero-rating is Zambia. 
Zambia is a Southern African nation with a weak democratic system. It is a 
presidential republic, but through much of its independent history, Zambia has 
been controlled by a single political party, the United National Independence 
Party (UNIP). Zambia went through a period of decentralization in the early 
1990s and has been undergoing economic reforms since the early 2010s.169 The 
political climate in Zambia, however, is not fully free according to Freedom 
House’s 2016 Freedom in the World Report.170 
As far as human development is concerned, Zambia is lagging, despite a 
significant increase in its Human Development Index (HDI) ranking from 2012 to 
2013. As noted above in Part II.B (Table 3), in 2013 Zambia was in the bottom of 
the medium development range with a ranking of 141 out of 187 nations by 
HDI.171 In 2012, however, it had ranked 163 with a lower HDI score than the 
average for “low development” countries, as well as for the sub-Saharan 
nations.172 In any event, the country’s GDP per capita is the lowest of any of the 
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States surveyed;173 for this reason, among others, the United Nations continues to 
list Zambia as one of the world’s 48 “least-developed” countries as of 2014.174 
Zambia allows for zero-rating: it was the first country in which Facebook 
rolled out Internet.org in July 2014.175 The country apparently does not yet have 
a concrete legal or policy framework when it comes to net neutrality.176 In 
general, net neutrality is not (yet) regulated in many African countries.177 The 
Internet Service Providers’ Association has stated that net neutrality is a “non-
issue” in countries like South Africa.178 Some argue that net neutrality laws 
address the quality of access and that only becomes relevant when there is a larger 
quantity of access.179 They state this as the reason that net neutrality laws have 
not spread further throughout Africa.180 While opponents of tighter net 
neutrality regulation in African countries do concede that zero-rating will make it 
harder for startups and easier for big names to dominate the market, they believe 
that “bad access trumps no access every single day of the week.”181 
Internet.org operates in Zambia through Airtel, a private telecommunications 
provider.182 In addition to services such as Facebook, Messenger, AccuWeather, 
Google Search, and Wikipedia, Internet.org gives Zambians access to UNICEF’s 
website for health and nutrition, including info on HIV/AIDS (Zambia uReport); 
other applications include a sports website, an independent news service, and a 
women’s rights app.183 Wikimedia Zero currently does not operate in Zambia.184 
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The arrival of Internet.org is significant because, historically, Zambia has had low 
Internet penetration rates. Between 2010 and 2014, Zambia increased Internet 
user percentage by over 50 percent, but that brought the total up to only 15.4 
percent of the population.185 By some accounts it has reached as high as seventeen 
percent.186 In its territory, Zambia only has four secure servers per one million 
people.187 As of 2010, only 1.3 percent of the population has Internet access at 
home, and less than 4 percent have a computer at home.188 However, over fifty 
percent of households have a mobile-cellular telephone.189 For these reasons, 
Zambia ranks 144 out of 166 countries ranked in the International 
Telecommunication Union’s Information and Communications Technology 
Development Index.190 
Although Zambia’s telecommunications sector is limited, it is in a period of 
growth. It has had a single privately owned ISP since the 1990s, but other private 
companies are starting.191 Moreover, the telecommunications regulator, the 
Zambia Information and Communications Technology Authority, is nominally 
independent.192 Its mission includes regulation, monitoring, standard setting, and 
promoting competition in the telecommunications sector.193 One of its strategic 
goals is to promote universal access in the population.194 Unfortunately, Zambia 
is one of the most corrupt of the countries surveyed, tied with India and only 
marginally better than Colombia.195 Overall, Transparency International ranks it 
85 out of 175 countries in the world.196 
There are two main obstacles to increased Internet connectivity in Zambia: 
the first is economic, and the second relates to infrastructure. As Zambia is a Least 
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Developed Country (LDC), national incomes are very low, and it is difficult for 
individuals to spend money on Internet access rather than other pressing 
necessities. For instance, while a gallon of milk in Zambia will cost the equivalent 
of about 4.6 U.S. dollars, a mobile Internet data bundle of 500MB for 30 days will 
cost approximately 20 U.S. dollars.197 Additionally, Zambia has a high tax burden 
on Internet access—the ratio of tax payments to mobile operator revenue is a high 
fifty-three percent.198 Infrastructure limitations also hinder increased access. 
Since Zambia is a landlocked nation, it does not have access to submarine cables, 
which can increase competition and bring down prices.199 In order to get access 
to these cables, Zambia would have to rely on coastal neighbors, which is not 
feasible in all situations.200 
b.   Chile 
Chile was the first nation in the world to adopt a net neutrality law in 
2010.201 It is a South American country with a strong democratic system based on 
popular elections and a multi-party political system. It operates on a presidential 
system with laws enacted by congress and implemented by the president. Freedom 
House scores Chile as “Free” with top scores in both Civil Liberties and Political 
Rights,202 whereas Press Freedom is categorized as only “partly free” based in part 
on a lack of competition in the media market.203 Corruption levels are relatively 
low, especially by regional standards. Transparency International (TI) ranks it 21 
out of 175 countries in terms of corruption, tied with Uruguay for the lowest 
levels in South America.204 Despite middle of the road GDP per capita, Chile 
ranks highly overall in human development. According to the UNDP, it is 41 out 
of 187 nations and has the highest human development in South America.205 
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XVKZ]; see International Human Development Indicators, U.N. DEV. PROGRAMME: HUMAN 
DEV. REPORTS (2015), http://hdr.undp.org/en/countries [https://perma.cc/PNT6-5NSX] (map 
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As far as economic development, the United Nations classifies Chile as a 
developing economy with high income (advancing from upper middle income 
status in 2014).206 Chile became a member of the Organization of Economic 
Cooperation (OECD) in 2010—the organization’s first member in South 
America.207 However, Chile also has high inequality, as evidenced by The World 
Bank scoring Chile at 50.8 in terms of GINI (where 0 is perfect equality and 100 is 
perfect inequality).208 
 As noted, in 2010 Chile was the first nation in the world to adopt a net 
neutrality law,209 banning most kinds of zero-rating. At a normative level, the 
provisions established by the law create a “blanket” bar to practices that violate net 
neutrality.210 Chile’s net neutrality laws state that ISPs will not be able to 
“arbitrarily block, interfere, discriminate, hinder or restrict content, applications 
or legal services that users perform in their networks.”211 Initially, the law’s 
prohibition on discrimination was applied to commonly zero-rated social media 
applications like Twitter, WhatsApp and Facebook.212 In 2014, the Subsecretería 
de Telecomunicaciones de Chile (Subtel), the telecommunications regulator, 
announced that such services were no longer allowed, subjecting any company 
 
showing Argentina as next ranked nation in South America at number forty-nine). 
 206.  Country Classification, U.N. (2014), 
http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/policy/wesp/wesp_current/2014wesp_country_clas
sification.pdf [https://perma.cc/BK9C-5EAY]. 
 207.  Chile Signs up as First OECD Member in South America, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-
OPERATION & DEV. (Nov. 1, 2010), 
http://www.oecd.org/chile/chilesignsupasfirstoecdmemberinsouthamerica.htm 
[https://perma.cc/HWS9-2EKW]; Members and Partners, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & 
DEV. (2016), http://www.oecd.org/about/membersandpartners [https://perma.cc/MR8F-
EQ6M]. 
 208.  GINI Index (World Bank Estimate), WORLD BANK (2016), 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.GINI [https://perma.cc/4AFH-4LQL].  
 209.  Ley No. 20.543, Consagra el Principio de Neutralided en la Red Para Los 
Consumidores y Usuarios de Internet, General de Telecomunicaciones, BIBLIOTECA DEL 
CONGRESO NACIONAL DE CHILE(18 Ago. 2010), 
http://www.leychile.cl/Navegar?idNorma=1016570&buscar=NEUTRALIDAD+DE+RED; 
Walker, supra note 201. 
 210.  Subsecreteria de Telecomunicaciones, Gobierno de Chile, Circular No. 
40/DAP 13221 /F-51 (Apr. 14 2014), 
http://www.subtel.gob.cl/transparencia/Perfiles/Transparencia20285/Normativas/Oficios/14o
c_0040.pdf [https://perma.cc/JYB8-M9C7]; Walker, supra note 201. 
 211.  Chile: First Country to Legislate Net Neutrality, GLOBAL VOICES (Sept. 4, 2010, 
2:49 PM GMT), https://globalvoices.org/2010/09/04/chile-first-country-to-legislate-net-
neutrality [https://perma.cc/3X4N-U8VF]. 
 212.  Glyn Moody, Chile Bans Free Delivery of Social Media Services to Uphold Net 
Neutrality, TECHDIRT (June 16, 2014, 2:11 PM), 
https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20140603/05442127439/chile-bans-free-delivery-social-
media-services-to-uphold-net-neutrality.shtml [https://perma.cc/639J-QYEP]; Ley de 
Neutralidad y Redes Sociales Gratis, SUBSECRETARIA DE TELECOMUNICACIONES (May 27, 2014), 
http://www.subtel.gob.cl/noticias/138-neutralidad-red/5311-ley-de-neutralidad-y-redes-
sociales-gratis [https://perma.cc/KC62-2V4C]. 
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that utilized them to fines.213 Internet.org was similarly shut down.214 While net 
neutrality activists were pleased by Chile’s approach, others called the practice 
shortsighted.215 Citing Chile’s high rate of mobile phone usage and relatively low 
wired and mobile internet usage, opponents argue that the Chilean plan lacked 
“nuance” and would hamper the growth of Internet access in the country.216 
 In practice, however, Chile’s net neutrality law today only bans zero-rating by 
mobile operators of social media apps and services offered as promotional or 
commercial schemes.217 Some forms of zero-rating continue to exist or be 
permitted by Subtel, including zero-rated social media platforms.218 Notably, 
Subtel issued an opinion stating that Wikipedia Zero did not violate the terms of 
the law, or Subtel’s interpretations of its net neutrality protections.219 
Unlike most other developing countries, Chile has significant Internet 
penetration. As of 2013, over sixty-six percent of the country has Internet access, 
and it has ninety-four secure servers per one million people.220 Nearly seventy 
percent of the population accesses the Internet daily,221 confirming that Chile 
faces relatively few specific barriers to Internet connectivity. As of 2011, over 
forty percent of households had Internet access in their homes.222 The country’s 
infrastructure suffered a hit from the February 2010 earthquake, but combined 
public and private efforts have invested in rebuilding.223 Although over ninety 
percent of Chileans own a cell phone, only thirty-nine percent own a 
smartphone.224 However, fifty-five percent of eighteen to twenty-nine year old 
Chileans have a smartphone, suggesting the breakdown is generational.225 
 
 213.  David Meyer, In Chile, Mobile Carriers Can No Longer Offer Free Twitter, 
Facebook or WhatsApp, GIGAOM (May 28, 2014, 3:28 AM CDT), 
https://gigaom.com/2014/05/28/in-chile-mobile-carriers-can-no-longer-offer-free-twitter-
facebook-and-whatsapp [https://perma.cc/AB43-URND]. 
   214.  Rossini Public Knowledge Paper, supra note 23, at 17-18. 
 215.  Leo Mirani, When Net Neutrality Backfires: Chile Just Killed Free Access to 
Wikipedia and Facebook, QUARTZ (May 30, 2014), http://qz.com/215064/when-net-
neutrality-backfires-chile-just-killed-free-access-to-wikipedia-and-facebook 
[https://perma.cc/A7FE-SHFG]. 
 216.  Id. 
  217.  Rossini Public Knowledge Paper, supra note 23, at 19-20. 
   218.  Id. See, e.g., Redes Sociales en tu Plan, CLAROCHILE, 
http://www.clarochile.cl/portal/cl/pc/personas/movil/redes-sociales/#04-redes-sociales-en-
tu-plan [https://perma.cc/G6TB-GG7A]. 
   219.   Id. 
 220.  Internet Users (per 100 People), supra note 123; Secure Internet Servers (per 1 
million people), supra note 187. 
 221.  Emerging Nations, supra note 187. 
 222.  Core Indicators on Access to and Use of ICT by Households and Individuals (Excel), 
INT’L TELECOMM. UNION (2016), http://www.itu.int/en/ITU-
D/Statistics/Pages/stat/default.aspx [https://perma.cc/5CLS-DKKH] [hereinafter Core 
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 223.  Id. 
 224.  Emerging Nations, supra note 187. 
 225.  Id. 
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Finally, the telecommunications sector in Chile is privatized.226 As we have seen, 
Subtel regulates the industry, including issuing licenses and promulgating 
standards.227 
c.   United States 
The United States ranks as a free democratic country and the world’s largest 
economy. Recent revelations regarding mass government surveillance have raised 
concerns regarding privacy and Internet freedom.228 Corruption is relatively low 
(the country comes in 17th out of 175 nations according to TI).229 According to 
the Human Development Report, the United States is a developed nation. It has 
high human development, ranking 5th of 166 nations.230 Moreover, the United 
States has the highest human development score in the Americas.231 
The United States does not prohibit zero-rating, but a pro-net neutrality bias 
requires that such practices be reviewed to safeguard against potentially unfair or 
harmful consequences.232 In its 2015 Open Internet Order, the FCC adopted a 
framework for regulating the Internet that is strongly protective of net neutrality 
in several respects.233 First, the FCC defined the scope of its new Rules as 
applying to “both fixed and mobile broadband Internet access service.”234 Second, 
the FCC enacted three bright-line rules that go to the heart of net neutrality 
protections: no blocking;235 no throttling;236 and no paid prioritization.237 
 
 226.  See Rossini Public Knowledge Paper, supra note 23, at 15-20 (describing Chile’s 
regulation of the private telecom companies in that country). 
 227.  Id. 
 228.  Freedom on the Net: United States 2014 Scores, FREEDOM HOUSE (2016), 
https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-net/2014/united-states [https://perma.cc/ML68-
24RG]. 
 229.  TRANSPARENCY INT’L, supra note 196; see supra Table 2. 
 230.  United States: Human Development Indicators, Human Development Reports, U.N. 
DEV. PROGRAMME: HUMAN DEV. REPORTS (2015), 
http://hdr.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/USA [https://perma.cc/LFN4-ZNTB]. 
 231.  See supra Table 3. 
 232.  See Arturo J. Carrillo & Dawn C. Nunziato, The Price of Paid Prioritization: The 
International and Domestic Consequences of the Failure to Protect Net Neutrality in the United 
States, GEO. J. INT’L AFF. (SUMMER 2015) 98, 98, http://journal.georgetown.edu/cyber-v 
[https://perma.cc/DA7K-QZRB]. 
 233.  Net Neutrality: President Obama’s Plan for a Free and Open Internet, WHITE HOUSE, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/net-neutrality [https://perma.cc/XCJ6-AN3W]. 
 234.  2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 1, at ¶ 25. 
 235.  Id. ¶ 112 (“A person engaged in the provision of broadband Internet access service, 
insofar as such person is so engaged, shall not block lawful content, applications, services, or 
nonharmful devices, subject to reasonable network management.”). 
 236.  Id. ¶ 119 (“A person engaged in the provision of broadband Internet access service, 
insofar as such person is so engaged, shall not impair or degrade unlawful Internet traffic on the 
basis of Internet content, application, or service, or use of a non-harmful device, subject to 
reasonable network management.”). 
 237.  Id. ¶ 125 (“A person engaged in the provision of broadband Internet access service, 
insofar as such person is so engaged, shall not engage in paid prioritization. ‘Paid prioritization’ 
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Finally, the FCC devised a way to reach other types of conduct that may not come 
under the bright-line rules by establishing its “no unreasonable 
interference/disadvantage standard.”238 Under this rule, ISPs cannot unreasonably 
interfere with or disadvantage either end users’ ability to use and access 
broadband service or Internet content or edge providers’ ability to make such 
content available to end users.239 In other words, the FCC decided that it would 
not apply a bright line rule to flatly prohibit sponsored data or “zero-rating” plans, 
but would instead evaluate these on a case-by-case basis under the “no 
unreasonable interference/disadvantage standard.”240 
Internet penetration is high across the United States, ranging from 
metropolitan to rural areas. In 2014, the US far outranked all other countries 
examined by the OECD in Internet coverage, with a total of 100,192,000 fixed and 
wireless broadband subscriptions.241 Regarding subscriptions per 100 people it 
came in 16th, with Korea and New Zealand being the only non-European 
countries to have a higher number of fixed and wireless subscriptions.242 Eighty-
four percent of the country has access, with sixty-eight percent of adults accessing 
through mobile connections and seventy percent of households having high-speed 
broadband.243 Currently, the access and scope of zero-rated services depend on 
different private mobile carrier options. T-Mobile, for instance, exempts specific 
music apps for zero-rating under some of its data plans, but not others.244 
C.   Concluding Observations 
In this second Part, I reviewed the different types of private sector zero-rating 
practices and organized them into four basic categories: single-site; compound; 
sponsored data; and faux/non-selective. I presented empirical data relating to 
 
refers to the management of a broadband network provider’s network to directly or indirectly 
favor some traffic over other traffic, including through use of techniques such as traffic shaping, 
prioritization, resource reservation, or other forms of preferential traffic management, either 
(a) in exchange for consideration (monetary or otherwise from a third party), or (b) to benefit 
an affiliated entity.”). 
 238.  Id. ¶ 136. (“Any person engaged in the provision of broadband Internet access service, 
insofar as such person is so engaged, shall not unreasonably interfere with or unreasonably 
disadvantage (i) end users’ ability to select, access, and use broadband Internet access service or 
the lawful Internet content, applications, services, or devices of their choice, or (ii) edge 
providers’ ability to make lawful content, applications, services, or devices available to end 
users. Reasonable network management shall not be considered a violation of this rule.”). 
 239. 2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 1, at ¶ 136. 
 240.  Id. ¶ 152. 
 241.  OECD Broadband Portal, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV. (Feb. 19, 2016), 
http://www.oecd.org/sti/broadband/oecdbroadbandportal.htm [https://perma.cc/JK4G-
9F5V]. 
 242.  Id. 
 243.  Freedom on the Net: United States 2014 Scores, supra note 228. 
 244.  Brad Molen, On T-Mobile, You Can Now Stream Music Without Hurting Your Data 
Plan, ENGADGET (June 18, 2015), http://www.engadget.com/2014/06/18/t-mobile-uncarrier-6 
[https://perma.cc/V5GG-BLFJ]; see also supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text. 
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Internet access, net neutrality and zero-rating around the world, as well as the 
specific socio-economic and political contexts in which those issues exist. This 
included a survey of the various barriers to connectivity, especially the high costs 
associated with Internet access in the developing world, which is an essential piece 
of the zero-rating puzzle. And, by viewing all this data through the lens of three 
representative case studies, I hope to have conveyed a better sense of the primary 
approaches considered or adopted by countries around the world as they attempt 
to regulate net neutrality and zero-rating. Now we are ready to turn to the 
international law framework. 
III.   “NEW” PERSPECTIVE: THE INTERNATIONAL LAW FRAMEWORK 
As important as it is to maintaining an open and free Internet, the principle 
of net neutrality is much more than that. Today, it is a well-established rule of 
international human rights law, an essential element of the rights to freedom of 
expression and non-discrimination online. But, how did it become so? No human 
rights treaty mentions the term “net neutrality,” which was famously coined by 
U.S. law professor Tim Wu only in 2003.245 More to the point: why does it 
matter? What is significant about the evolution of net neutrality from a U.S.-
based normative principle and proposed policy priority, to a human rights rule 
binding on States? Why should—indeed, must—defenders and critics of net 
neutrality alike understand the human rights implications of that rule today? 
Those are the questions to be addressed here, among others. 
In this Part, I trace the evolution of net neutrality as a human rights norm 
before situating it within the legal frameworks for analyzing such rights. It is 
divided into three subparts. In the first, I respond to the question, “How did net 
neutrality become a norm of international human rights law?” This initial subpart 
looks at how net neutrality rose to become an integral part of freedom of 
expression, which is defined as the rights to impart, seek and receive information, 
on the one hand, and the right to Internet access or “connectivity” on the other. 
The second subpart outlines the contemporary legal frameworks involved, 
including non-discrimination norms and their effect on freedom of expression 
rights as applied. It also sets out the exceptions regime established in human rights 
law for determining when restrictions on fundamental rights by States are 
permitted. In the third and final subpart, I answer the question of why it is 
important, if not necessary, that we treat net neutrality as what it undisputedly 
has become: a multi-faceted norm of modern human rights law. 
A.   How Net Neutrality Became a Norm of International Human Rights Law 
Net neutrality did not begin as a human right. Decades ago, the concept of an 
 
 245.  Tim Wu, Network Neutrality, Broadband Discrimination, 2 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH 
TECH. L. 141, 141 (2003). 
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“open” or data neutral network was built into the nascent Internet by design.246 
This “openness” encompassed not just engineering in terms of software and 
standards, but also the liberal values of free speech and egalitarianism derived 
from the milieu in which the Internet was created.247 The “open Internet” was 
meant to guarantee the free, unregulated flow of information from “end-to-end,” 
that is, without substantial interference during the transmission of data from one 
“intelligent” user to another, over the “dumb” pipes or physical network.248 “One 
consequence of this design is a principle of non-discrimination among 
applications.”249 Another consequence was the meteoric growth and success of 
the Internet as a communications network.250 Not surprisingly, early activists 
heralded the Internet as a great liberating force, not least because “cyberspace” was 
viewed as inherently free of the types of territorial boundaries, government 
regulation and economic control that plagued other communications systems.251 
It has since become abundantly clear that this is no longer the case, if it ever 
was.252 
Though the concept was already present, the term net neutrality did not exist 
in discussion of Internet policy until 2003. It was born in the midst of a debate 
raging in the United States over how to best ensure “open access” to the Internet 
through regulation in light of the advances in broadband services at the turn of 
the century.253 The concern was that allowing the integration of ISP and content 
provider services by cable companies would lead to a disruption of the “end-to-
end” principle that, as just noted, had proven indispensable to the extraordinary 
growth of the Internet.254 While promoters of “open access” proposed structural 
remedies aimed at preserving the Internet’s natural architecture (i.e. prohibiting 
the proposed mergers),255 Tim Wu proposed instead the adoption of a policy 
directive—net neutrality—that was the “concrete expression of a system of belief 
about innovation.”256 In so doing, he gave a proper name to the non-
 
 246.  JACK GOLDSMITH & TIM WU, WHO CONTROLS THE INTERNET?: ILLUSIONS OF A 
BORDERLESS WORLD 23-25 (2006). 
 247.  Mark A. Lemley & Lawrence Lessig, The End of End-to-End: Preserving the 
Architecture of the Internet in the Broadband Era, 48 UCLA L. Rev. 925, 930 (2001); see also 
GOLDSMITH & WU, supra note 246, at 19. 
 248.  Lemley & Lessig, supra note 247, at 930-31. On the unregulated nature of the early 
Internet, see also LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE: VERSION 2.0 1-82 (2006) [hereinafter LESSIG, CODE]. 
 249.  Lemley & Lessig, supra note 247, at 931. 
 250.  Id. 
 251.  GOLDSMITH & WU, supra note 246, at 17-21. 
 252.  See LESSIG, CODE, supra note 248, Ch. 3; see generally GOLDSMITH & WU, supra note 
246 (describing the evolution of a territorially bound “bordered” Internet subject to traditional 
poitical and economic forces); EVGENY MOROZOV, THE NET DELUSION: THE DARK SIDE OF 
INTERNET FREEDOM (2012) (debunking the myth of “cyber-utopianism,” the belief that the 
internet is essentially a liberating, countervailing force to authoritarian regimes). 
 253.  See Lemley & Lessig, supra note 247, at 930; Wu, supra note 245, at 141. 
 254.  Lemley & Lessig, supra note 247, at 931. 
 255.  Id. 
 256.  Wu, supra note 245, at 145. By prohibiting discrimination in the provision of 
broadband services and content, regulators could ensure that the competitive “playing field” 
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discriminatory character of the “end-to-end” principle at the core of the “open” 
Internet. In other words, Wu sought to shift the terms of the U.S. debate about 
how best to preserve the virtues of the “open” Internet away from a discussion of 
the need for structural remedies towards one focused on normative policy-making 
and the pro-competition principle of net-neutrality.257 He succeeded.258 
It is unlikely that the academic proponents of net neutrality principles in the 
United States during the decade of the 2000s could have foreseen the international 
impact of their creation. Yet by 2015, the concept of a data-neutral network based 
on the “end-to-end” principle, as well as the term net neutrality itself, had been 
largely “uploaded’ into human rights law and discourse.259 Relative to the 
formation of international law generally, this evolution occurred in the blink of 
an eye. Essential to framing this process were definitive statements by the United 
Nations’ primary human rights bodies confirming the convergence of human 
rights and the digital realm. Most notably, the United Nations Human Rights 
Council in June 2012 adopted its landmark resolution on “[t]he promotion, 
protection and enjoyment of human rights and the Internet,” in which it 
established that “the same rights that people have offline must also be protected 
online, in particular freedom of expression, which is applicable regardless of 
frontiers and through any media of one’s choice.”260 A year before, in September 
2011, the UN Human Rights Committee issued an updated General Comment on 
ICCPR Article 19 in which it expressly established that the Covenant’s protections 
were equally in force for all “Internet-based modes of expression.”261 While the 
Human Rights Council’s resolution in itself does not possess any normative force, 
 
remained level or “meritocratic” for application developers wanting to access those networks, 
regardless of who controlled them. 
 257.  At the time, Wu was less concerned with the preserving the architectural purity of 
the open Internet than he was promoting a form of “Darwinian competition” in which “only the 
best survive.” Wu, supra note 245, at 142. 
 258.  No need to look further for evidence of this than the FCC’s 2015 Open Internet 
Order adopting precisely the type of net neutrality principle posited by Wu in 2003. See 2015 
Open Internet Order, supra note 1. 
  259. See, e.g., Luca Belli, End-to-End, Net Neutrality and Human Rights, in NET 
NEUTRALITY COMPENDIUM: HUMAN RIGHTS, FREE COMPETITION AND THE FUTURE OF THE 
INTERNET 13, 22-23 (Luca Belli & Primavera De Filippi eds., Springer 2015). 
 260.  Human Rights Council Res. 20/8, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/20/L.13, at ¶ 1 (June 29, 2012), 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/RegularSessions/Session20/Pages/ResDecStat.asp
x [https://perma.cc/BFA4-RQLJ] (emphasis added). In a prior resolution from 2011, the HRC 
had already made reference to the importance of safeguarding the freedom of expression rights 
of journalist and media workers on the Internet as part of a more general statement about 
media freedoms. G.A. Res. 66/184, at 2-3 (Dec. 22, 2011). At the same time, Internet 
governance and the importance of digital technologies for development has long been a subject 
of attention in the United Nations, which spearheaded the WSIS process and sponsored regular 
Internet Governance Forums. See, e.g., Human Rights Council Res. 12/16, U.N. Doc. 
A/HRC/RES/12/16 (Oct. 2, 2009). 
 261.  U.N. Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 34, International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights, ¶¶ 12, 15, 39, 43, & 44, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GC/34 (Sept. 12, 2011) 
[hereinafter HRC GC 34]. 
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it is hugely significant as a unanimous decision by the UN’s premier human rights 
institution not just to recognize this convergence, but to urge it forward as well. 
Though not as high profile as the Council’s resolution, the Human Rights 
Committee’s revised General Comment 34 is arguably the weightier statement, 
because it is imbued with legal force.262 
Yet neither the Human Rights Council’s resolution nor the Human Rights 
Committee’s General Comment mentions net neutrality per se. The first official 
recognition of net neutrality’s incorporation into international human rights law 
was the June 2011 Joint Declaration on Freedom of Expression and the Internet 
issued by the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and 
Expression; the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) 
Representative on Freedom of the Media; the Organization of American States 
(OAS) Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression; and the African 
Commission on Peoples and Human Rights’ Special Rapporteur on Freedom of 
Expression and Access to Information (hereinafter “Joint Declaration”).263 Among 
the principles set out in the Joint Declaration is the terse imperative that “[t]here 
should be no discrimination in the treatment of Internet data and traffic, based on 
the device, content, author, origin and/or destination of the content, service or 
application.”264 No rationale is given to explain how or why this principle was 
now a norm of human rights on the Internet.265 A more thorough discussion of 
net neutrality’s relationship to freedom of expression did not appear until 
December 2013, when the Inter-American Commission’s Special Rapporteur 
published her report entitled Freedom of Expression and the Internet.266 
Building on the Joint Declaration she signed, the OAS Special Rapporteur on 
Freedom of Expression, Catalina Botero, observed in her 2013 Report that “[n]et 
neutrality is part of the original design of the Internet . . . [and] is fundamental for 
 
 262.  The Committee’s interpretations of the ICCPR’s provisions are, under the treaty 
itself, authoritative, and as such obligate States to comply. International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights art. 40, Dec. 16, 1966, 1976 U.N.T.S. 999 [hereinafter ICCPR]. 
 263.  Joint Declaration, supra note 9. 
 264.  Id. ¶ 5(a). 
 265.  The preamble notes that the subject matter of the Joint Declaration was “discussed . . . 
together with the assistance of ARTICLE 19, Global Campaign for Free Expression and the 
Centre for Law and Democracy.” Id. What is clear is that net neutrality had figured prominently 
for several years prior in the advocacy work carried out by international NGOs like Article 19 
and others. See, e.g., DYNAMIC COAL. ON NETWORK NEUTRALITY, THE VALUE OF NETWORK 
NEUTRALITY FOR THE INTERNET OF TOMORROW 2 (Luca Belli & Primavera De Filippi eds., 2013), 
http://www.networkneutrality.info/sources.html [https://perma.cc/8TYT-W53Q]; Luca Belli, 
Council of Europe Multi-Stakeholder Dialogue on Network Neutrality and Human Rights 
¶¶ 16, 17 (2013), 
http://mailman.edri.org/pipermail/nncoalition/attachments/20130704/17c53a01/attachment-
0001.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZQ5Y-RE9N]. So it is fair to assume that this work, as well as the 
specific consultation with the NGOs, shaped the Joint Declaration.  
 266. CATALINA BOTERO, OAS SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR ON FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, FREEDOM 
OF EXPRESSION AND THE INTERNET (2014), 
http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/expression/docs/reports/2014_04_08_Internet_ENG%20_WEB.
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guaranteeing the plurality and diversity of the flow of information.”267 
Interpreting the American Convention on Human Rights, the Special Rapporteur 
affirmed categorically that respecting net neutrality “is a necessary condition for 
exercising freedom of expression on the Internet pursuant to the terms [of the 
Convention’s] Article 13.”268 Curiously, neither of the UN Special Rapporteur’s 
2011 reports on freedom of expression and the Internet (one to the Human Rights 
Council, the other to the General Assembly) mentions, much less discusses, net 
neutrality.269 Nor has the African Commission’s Special Rapporteur Faith Pansy 
Tiakula apparently pursued the topic in her subsequent publications or 
advocacy.270 
Following the lead of her OAS counterpart, the OSCE’s Representative on 
Freedom of the Media, Dunja Mijatović, similarly continued to advocate for net 
neutrality as a core principle of human rights. In June 2014, in response to the 
U.S. Federal Communications Commission’s proposed rules to regulate net 
neutrality, the OSCE Representative published a report citing the Joint 
Declaration that concluded “that the FCC’s Proposed Rules threaten the free flow 
of information on the Internet and endanger freedom of expression and freedom 
of the media values.”271 In her presentation of the report, Mijatović observed that 
“[t]he Internet was conceived as an open medium with the free flow of 
information as one of its fundamental characteristics. . . . This should be 
guaranteed without discrimination and regardless of the content, destination, 
author, device used or origin.”272 
At a minimum, it is evident from the foregoing that the process of uploading 
the principle of net neutrality into official human rights discourse globally is well 
underway.273 Somewhat less apparent is exactly how, as a technical matter, this 
 
 267.  Id. ¶¶ 27-28. 
 268.  Id. ¶ 25. Article 13 of the American Convention states that “[e]veryone has the right 
to freedom of thought and expression. This right includes freedom to seek, receive, and impart 
information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing, in print, in 
the form of art, or through any other medium of one’s choice” and that  
the right of expression may not be restricted by indirect methods or means, such as the abuse of 
government or private controls over newsprint, radio broadcasting frequencies, or equipment 
used in the dissemination of information, or by any other means tending to impede the 
communication and circulation of ideas and opinions.  
American Convention on Human Rights art. 13, Nov. 22, 1969, 114 U.N.T.S. 148-49. 
 269.  See infra notes 284-296 and accompanying text. 
 270.  See African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Special Rapporteur on 
Freedom of Expression and Access to Information (Nov. 18, 2015), 
http://www.achpr.org/mechanisms/freedom-of-expression [https://perma.cc/5JAZ-VY6C]. 
 271.  Dawn C. Nunziato, Org. for Sec. & Coop. in Europe, The U.S. Federal 
Communications Commission’s Proposed Rulemaking in the Matter of Protecting and 
Promoting the Open Internet 3 (2014), http://www.osce.org/fom/119819 
[https://perma.cc/BQP3-EJR7]. 
 272.  Press Release, OSCE, OSCE Representative Warns that U.S. Proposed Rules on Net 
Neutrality Can Hurt Online Media Freedom (June 16, 2014), http://www.osce.org/fom/119822 
[https://perma.cc/TMD7-PYGB]. 
 273.  See, e.g., LUCA BELLI & MATTHIJS VAN BERGEN, COUNCIL OF EUR., PROTECTING HUMAN 
RIGHTS THROUGH NETWORK NEUTRALITY: FURTHERING INTERNET USERS’ INTEREST, 
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principle integrates fully into the international law framework for human rights. 
Certainly by now it seems obvious that “the purpose of this principle is to ensure 
that free access and user choice to use, send, receive or offer any lawful content, 
application or service through the Internet is [sic] not subject to conditions, or 
directed or restricted, such as blocking, filtering or interference.”274 This was an 
important part of what the UN Human Rights Council and Human Rights 
Committee intended to cover when they affirmed the extension of human rights 
law into the digital realm, though neither body mentioned net neutrality by name. 
But is that the extent of the convergence of net neutrality and human rights law? 
What other dimensions or ramifications are there to incorporating net neutrality 
into freedom of expression’s panoply of rights? Are there other human rights that 
might be implicated too? A handful of academics and civil society commentators 
have started to explore the legal justifications behind the status of net neutrality as 
a norm of human rights.275 But more theorizing is needed in this direction if the 
foundations of net neutrality as a norm of human rights are to be secured. 
B.   Net Neutrality and Contemporary Human Rights Law 
The human rights law foundations supporting a net neutrality norm are not 
well understood. In this respect, I seek to clarify three premises in this subpart. 
First, by outlining the international law framework governing freedom of 
expression and its several constituent rights, it becomes clear that net neutrality 
reacts with more than just the right to impart or access information without 
restrictions. In particular, the right to access the Internet, or “connectivity,” is an 
equal normative imperative to the realization of freedom of expression. Second, to 
appreciate how net neutrality operates as a guarantor of freedom of expression 
requires understanding how the distinct non-discrimination rules built into 
human rights law are separately natural receptors of that principle as well. And 
third, regardless of whether one prefers to view net neutrality primarily as a 
function of expression or as a non-discrimination norm, it is a norm of human 
rights that, as such, is subject to the exceptions regime established by international 
law for determining the permissible limits States can impose on fundamental 
rights. This means that, like all such rights, it is not absolute. 
Before turning to the discussion at hand, it is necessary to briefly recall the 
 
MODERNIZING HUMAN RIGHTS AND SAFEGUARDING THE OPEN INTERNET 3 (2013), 
http://www.pdf-archive.com/2016/03/01/report-belli-van-begren-net-neutrality-cdmsi-
2013/preview/page/1 [https://perma.cc/J9DC-32WC]; OAS SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR REPORT, 
supra note 266. By “official” human rights discourse I am referring to that produced by inter-
governmental human rights organizations and their experts charged with providing 
authoritative interpretations of international human rights law. 
 274.  OAS SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR REPORT, supra note 266, ¶ 25. 
 275.  See, e.g., CDT REPORT 2013, supra note 25; DYNAMIC COAL. ON NETWORK 
NEUTRALITY, THE VALUE OF NETWORK NEUTRALITY FOR THE INTERNET OF TOMORROW (Luca 
Belli & Primavera De Filippi eds., 2013), http://www.networkneutrality.info/sources.html 
[https://perma.cc/8TYT-W53Q] [hereinafter DYNAMIC COAL. REPORT]. 
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scope of a State’s duty to respect and guarantee respect for human rights under 
international law. It is well settled that States must do three things to comply with 
their human rights obligations. First, they must act in good faith to adopt the laws 
and other measures necessary to implement and give effect to those human rights 
they are bound to respect.276 Second, they must ensure that their agents do not 
violate human rights directly through their actions or omissions, and if they do, 
provide adequate and effective remedies for victims to redress those 
transgressions.277 Third, States have an affirmative duty to guarantee the 
enjoyment of human rights to all persons in their territory or under their 
jurisdiction, which means they must act diligently to prevent abuses by third 
parties, and provide adequate and effective remedies whenever private actor 
abuses occur.278 In this latter respect: 
[T]he positive obligations on States . . . to ensure [human] rights will only be 
fully discharged if individuals are protected by the State, not just against 
violations of [these] rights by its agents, but also against acts committed by 
private persons or entities that would impair the enjoyment of [these] rights in 
so far as they are amenable to application between private persons or entities. 
There may be circumstances in which a failure to ensure [human] rights as 
required by [international law] would give rise to violations by States . . . of 
those rights, as a result of States . . . failing to take appropriate measures or to 
exercise due diligence to prevent, punish, investigate or redress the harm causes 
by such acts by private persons or entities.279 
1.   Freedom of Expression in International Law 
Few rights are as defined with such particularity as freedom of expression. 
Article 19 of the ICCPR, for example, affirms the right “to seek, receive and 
 
276.  See U.N. Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 31, The Nature of the 
General Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add. 13 (May 26, 2004) [hereinafter HRC GC 31]; see also Organization of 
African Unity, African [Banjul] Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights art. 1, opened for 
signature June 27, 1981, 1520 U.N.T.S. 123 [hereinafter Banjul Charter on Human Rights] 
(entered into force Oct. 21, 1986); Organization of American States, American Convention on 
Human Rights art. 1, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 (entered into force 
July 18, 1978); Council of Europe, Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms art. 1, opened for signature Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 [hereinafter 
European Convention on Human Rights] (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953).  
 277.  See American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 276, art. 25; European 
Convention on Human Rights, supra note 276, art. 13; HRC GC 31, supra note 276, ¶¶ 8, 15. 
 278.  See, e.g., HRC GC 31, supra note 276. This affirmative duty under international 
human rights law contrasts sharply with the primarily negative one imposed on government 
actors by the First Amendment in the United States. See DAWN C. NUNZIATO, VIRTUAL 
FREEDOM: NET NEUTRALITY AND FREE SPEECH IN THE INTERNET AGE 2, 23 (2009). 
 279.  HRC GC 31, supra note 276, ¶ 8; see also Application of Convention on Prevention 
and Punishment of Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro), Judgment, 2007 
I.C.J. 43, ¶ 166 (Feb. 26) (finding that there is a due diligence obligation for States “to employ 
the means at their disposal . . . to prevent persons or groups not directly under their authority 
from committing” acts of genocide). 
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impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, 
in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of . . . 
choice.”280 This language mirrors that of Article 19 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights [hereinafter “UDHR”].281 Substantially similar 
language is found in Article 10 of the European Convention on Fundamental 
Rights and Freedoms, and Article 13 of the American Convention on Human 
Rights.282 Moreover, many if not most nations in the world have adopted 
norms protecting free speech and expression in their constitutions.283 Freedom 
of expression enjoys near universal acceptance worldwide, not least because it 
is correctly viewed as an enabler of several other basic human rights. These 
include not just the corollary rights to hold opinions and religious beliefs 
without interference, but others as well, such as the right to education, the right 
to freedom of association and assembly, the right to full participation in social, 
cultural and political life, and the right to social and economic development.284 
Traditionally, freedom of expression has been broken down into several 
constituent elements, namely: (1) the right to impart or express information and 
ideas generally; (2) media rights; (3) the right to seek and receive information and 
ideas generally; and (4) the right to access information “held by public bodies.”285 
In particular, it is important to highlight the importance of media pluralism, 
which States are bound to promote by taking “appropriate action [. . .], to prevent 
undue media dominance or concentration by privately controlled media groups in 
monopolistic situations that may be harmful to a diversity of sources and 
views.”286  
Since the rise of electronic communications, the foregoing framework of 
freedom of expression has evolved to accommodate the transmission and receipt 
of information and ideas via the Internet. As noted in the preceding section, it is 
settled that the constituent rights comprising freedom of expression will today 
apply to all “internet-based modes of communication.”287 What this means as a 
practical matter is that “[a]ny restrictions on the operation of websites, blogs or 
any other internet-based, electronic or other such information dissemination 
system, including systems to support such communication, such as internet 
 
 280.  ICCPR, supra note 262, art. 19(2). 
 281.  G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, at 19 (Dec. 10, 1948).  
 282.  American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 276, art. 13; European 
Convention on Human Rights, supra note 276, art. 10. 
 283.  See, e.g., TOBY MENDEL ET AL., UNESCO SERIES ON INTERNET FREEDOM, GLOBAL 
SURVEY ON INTERNET PRIVACY AND FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 74-92 (2012). 
 284.  Frank La Rue (Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to 
Freedom of Opinion and Expression), Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and 
Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, ¶ 61, U.N. Doc. A/66/290 
(Aug. 10, 2011) [hereinafter SR GA Report 2011]. 
 285.  HRC GC 34, supra note 261, art. 19 ¶¶ 11, 18. Each of these is described more fully in 
General Comment No. 34. Media rights, for example, are described in more detail in ¶¶ 13-17, 
37-42.  
 286. Id. ¶ 40. 
 287. Id. ¶ 12. 
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service providers or search engines, are only permissible to the extent that they 
are compatible with paragraph 3 [of Article 19].”288 I’ll come back to the 
exceptions regime below. 
It is likewise helpful to recall here that the State responsibility regime 
summarized at the outset of this subpart specifically “requires States to ensure that 
persons are protected from any acts by private persons or entities that would 
impair the enjoyment of the freedoms of opinion and expression to the extent that 
these . . . rights are amenable to application between private persons or 
entities.”289 States have an affirmative duty, therefore, to adopt measures and act 
diligently to ensure that freedom of expression rights are protected from private 
actor conduct that might impinge on the enjoyment of those rights by others.290 
Rounding out the panoply of freedom of expression rights relating to net 
neutrality is the newest dimension of the right to access information: 
connectivity.291 Put simply, “[g]iving effect to the right to freedom of expression 
imposes an obligation on States to promote universal access to the Internet.”292 
This positive obligation means that for States to meet their duty to respect and 
fulfill the right to freedom of expression, they must guarantee that all people 
within their territory have access to “the means necessary to exercise this right, 
which [today] includes the Internet.”293 Accordingly, the UN Human Rights 
Committee has called upon States “to take all necessary steps to foster the 
independence of . . . new media . . . such as internet and mobile based electronic 
information dissemination systems . . . and to ensure access of all individuals 
thereto.”294 Connectivity is thus “essential” to realizing freedom of expression.295 
The good faith duty incumbent on States to work diligently towards the 
effective implementation of freedom of expression is equally as relevant to 
progressively realizing other fundamental rights too, such as the rights to 
education, health, socio-economic development, and political participation.296 It 
 
 288.  Id. ¶ 43. 
 289.  Id. ¶ 7. 
 290.  See supra notes 278-279 and accompanying text. 
 291. There does not appear to be a universally accepted definition of connectivity in 
international law or practice. “Connectivity” is understood here as access to any kind of Internet 
connection that provides full or partial access to services, applications and information available 
online. See SR GA Report 2011, supra note 284, Part IV.  
 292.  Joint Declaration, supra note 9, ¶ 6(a); see also Human Rights Council Res. 20/8, 
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/20/L.13, at ¶ 1 (June 29, 2012), 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/RegularSessions/Session20/Pages/ResDecStat.asp
x [https://perma.cc/BFA4-RQLJ]. 
 293.  See SR GA Report 2011, supra note 284, ¶ 61.  
 294.  HRC GC 34, supra note 261, ¶ 15 (emphasis added); see also OAS SPECIAL 
RAPPORTEUR REPORT, supra note 266, ¶ 11 (“It is important for all regulation to be based on 
dialogue among all actors and to maintain the basic characteristics of the original environment, 
strengthening the Internet’s democratizing capacity and fostering universal and 
nondiscriminatory access.”). 
 295.  See SR GA Report 2011, supra note 284, ¶ 61. 
 296.  Human Rights Council Res. 20/8, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/20/L.13, at ¶ 1 (June 29, 2012), 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/RegularSessions/Session20/Pages/ResDecStat.asp
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2746447
412 STANFORD TECHNOLOGY LAW REVIEW Vol. 19:364 
is for these reasons that the top experts of four major human rights legal systems 
stressed in 2011 that, at a minimum, States are required to “[p]ut in place 
regulatory mechanisms—which could include pricing regimes, universal service 
requirements and licensing agreements—that foster greater access to the Internet, 
including for the poor and in ‘last mile’ rural areas.”297 In modern times, it is 
difficult to overstate the transcendental role that connectivity as an integral part of 
freedom of expression plays in the realization of human rights generally. 
2.   Non-discrimination in International Law 
Non-discrimination is a first order principle of international human rights 
law. “Non-discrimination, together with equality before the law and equal 
protection of the law without any discrimination, constitute a basic and general 
principle relating to the protection of human rights.”298 It is for this reason that, 
once again mirroring the UDHR, the ICCPR establishes that States are obligated 
“to respect and to ensure to all individuals within [their] territory and subject to 
[their] jurisdiction the [human] rights recognized . . . without distinction of any 
kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, 
national or social origin, property, birth or other status.”299 At the same time, “all 
persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to 
the equal protection of the law.”300 This provision prohibits “discrimination 
under the law and guarantees to all persons equal and effective protection against 
discrimination on any ground,” or based on any kind of distinction of the types 
listed above.301 Anti-discrimination principles substantially similar to these 
appear in every universal and regional human rights treaty.302 So, to the extent 
that net neutrality is best understood as a principle of non-discrimination applied 
to users’ rights to request, receive, or impart data or information online, it meshes 
organically with the core non-discrimination norms of international human 
rights law. 
Unlawful discrimination of any type is a negation of human equality and 
dignity. Under international human rights law it is defined as any  
distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference which is based on any ground 
such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national 
 
x [https://perma.cc/BFA4-RQLJ]; see also infra notes 318-331 and accompanying text. On the 
duty of States to implement their basic human rights obligations, see, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 
262, art. 2(2). 
 297.  Joint Declaration, supra note 9, ¶ 6(e)(i). 
 298. U.N. Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 18, Non-Discrimination, ¶ 1, 
U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 (July 29, 1994) [hereinafter HRC GC 18]. 
 299.  ICCPR, supra note 262, art. 2; see also HRC GC 18, supra note 298, ¶ 1. 
 300.  ICCPR, supra note 262, art. 26. 
 301.  HRC GC 18, supra note 298, ¶ 1. 
 302.  See e.g. Banjul Charter on Human Rights, supra note 276, art. 2; American 
Convention on Human Rights, supra note 276, art. 24; European Convention on Human 
Rights, supra note 276, art. 14. 
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or social origin, property, birth, or other status, and which has the purpose or 
effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by all 
persons, on an equal footing, of all rights and freedoms.303  
But not all discrimination is per se illegal. International law differentiates 
between negative and positive discrimination. The “principle of equality 
sometimes requires States parties to take affirmative action in order to diminish 
or eliminate conditions which cause or help to perpetuate discrimination 
prohibited [by international law].”304 For this reason, “[n]ot every differentiation 
of treatment will constitute [unlawful] discrimination, if the criteria for such 
differentiation are reasonable and objective and if the aim is to achieve a purpose 
which is legitimate under the [international law].”305 
The remaining question is what counts as “other status” for purposes of 
determining what additional distinctions might lead to negative (or positive) 
discrimination. Of relevance is the fact that international human rights law 
recognizes distinctions based on economic status or criteria, and evaluates 
whether their purpose or effect is to nullify or impair the exercise or enjoyment of 
other human rights.306 So, for example, the UN Human Rights Committee found 
that Iceland’s legal differentiation between two groups of fishermen, one of which 
was forced to pay exorbitant catching fees to the other to whom the State had 
granted permanent, exclusive quota-based licenses for historical reasons, 
constituted an unlawful distinction based on unreasonable “property entitlement 
privileges.”307 On the other hand, as noted above, where such a distinction is 
based instead on “reasonable and objective” criteria, and is intended to advance a 
valid State aim, it can be deemed to reflect a “legitimate differentiation” under 
international law.308 So, for instance, a State could adopt temporary tax breaks for 
low-income workers in a critical but depressed sector of the economy, say, 
construction.309 Even though the measures would discriminate against similarly 
situated workers in other sectors that did not receive the tax breaks, the State 
arguably would be pursuing a legitimate aim (bolstering an important sector of its 
economy and advancing socio-economic rights) by utilizing objective criteria 
(focusing on low-income, depressed sector workers) to adopt reasonable measures 
 
 303.  HRC GC 18, supra note 298, ¶ 7 (emphasis added). 
 304.  Id. ¶ 10. 
 305.  Id. ¶ 13. 
 306.  See Haraldsson v. Iceland, U.N. Human Rights Comm., Communication No. 
1306/2004, ¶ 10.3, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/91/D/1306/2004 (Oct. 24, 2007), 
http://www.worldcourts.com/hrc/eng/decisions/2007.10.24_Haraldsson_v_Iceland.htm 
[https://perma.cc/NH8A-PM2X]. 
 307.  Id. ¶¶ 10.3-10.4. (“The Committee concludes that . . . the property entitlement 
privilege accorded permanently to the original [fishing] quota owners, to the detriment of the 
[other fishermen], is not based on reasonable grounds.”).  
 308.  See supra notes 304-305 and accompanying text. 
 309.  See, e.g., Brandsma v. Netherlands, U.N. Human Rights Comm., Communication No. 
977/2001, ¶¶ 6.3-6.4, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/80/D/977/2001 (Apr. 1, 2004), 
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/undocs/html/977-2001.html [https://perma.cc/YV53-
YBWV]. 
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(tax breaks of limited duration) to meet that aim.310 Such a policy would likely not 
violate the non-discrimination obligations imposed by international human rights 
law. 
3.   The Exceptions Regime for Freedom of Expression 
Human rights norms in general, and freedom of expression in particular, are 
not absolute.311 Human rights law expressly permits certain restrictions on the 
right to freedom of expression that “respect . . . the rights or reputations of others” 
or advance “the protection of national security, or of public order . . . , or of public 
health or morals.”312 These are, generally speaking, legitimate aims that will 
justify State action when acting to curtail fundamental human rights such as 
expression.313 But, of course, there may be others. We saw how States can in 
limited circumstances apply positive discrimination to address the social and other 
consequences of prior invidious discrimination.314 In addition to pursuing a 
legitimate goal, a State seeking to limit freedom of expression must ensure that 
any restrictions are “provided by law,” “necessary” to meet that aim, and 
“proportional.”315 The existence of this exceptions regime, however, is not a 
blank check: “[W]hen a State party imposes restrictions on the exercise of 
freedom of expression, these may not put in jeopardy the right itself.”316 In other 
words, exceptions must remain exceptional, and cannot become the rule.317 
Each element of the exceptions framework merits further explanation. The 
legitimate aims States can pursue are stipulated in international law.318 Here, it is 
worth highlighting the objective of protecting or advancing other people’s rights 
 
 310.  Id. The Human Rights Committee did not reach the case on the merits, finding it 
inadmissible for lack of evidence that the tax payment schemes at issue were substantially 
comparable. Id. However, the HRC’s discussion of the underlying issues suggests that it might 
otherwise have found such a scheme to advance the State’s legitimate aim in a permissible 
manner. See id. ¶¶ 4.6-4.7.  
 311.  A good example is ICCPR, supra note 262, art. 20, which explicitly enumerates a 
series of offensive forms of expression that States must curtail in order to meet their obligations 
under the treaty. (“1. Any propaganda for war shall be prohibited by law. 2. Any advocacy of 
national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or 
violence shall be prohibited by law.”). 
 312.  ICCPR, supra note 262, art. 19(3); see also HRC GC 34, supra note 261, ¶¶ 28-32. 
 313.  See Frank La Rue (Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right 
to Freedom of Opinion and Expression), Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion 
and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, ¶ 28, U.N. Doc. 
A/HRC/23/40 (Apr. 17, 2013) (“The framework for article 17 of the ICCPR enables necessary, 
legitimate and proportionate restrictions to the right to privacy by means of permissible 
limitations.”). 
 314.  See supra notes 303-304 and accompanying text. 
 315.  ICCPR, supra note 262, art. 19(3); HRC GC 34, supra note 261, ¶¶ 24-26, 33-34; SR 
GA Report 2011, supra note 284, ¶ 15. 
 316.  HRC GC 34, supra note 261, ¶ 21. 
 317.  Id. (“[T]he relation between right and restriction and between norm and exception 
must not be reversed.”). 
 318.  ICCPR, supra note 262, arts. 19, 20. 
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as a basis for restricting a given norm. Defamation laws are classic examples of 
hard limits imposed on freedom of expression to protect the reputation of 
others.319 And just as “legitimate differentiation” in favor of historically 
disadvantaged groups can affirmatively advance the goals of non-
discrimination,320 so too can freedom of expression rights be curtailed to promote 
the freedom of expression rights of others.321 Thus, for example, “it may be 
permissible to protect voters [who wish to express their political opinions] from 
forms of expression that constitute intimidation or coercion . . . .”322 In practice, 
States are typically given leeway in determining what policies they can adopt to 
advance or meet specific goals within the general categories of legitimate aims 
identified.323 
Assuming that a State’s goal is to advance a legitimate aim recognized by 
international law, any proposed restriction on freedom of expression must not 
only be provided by law, but also necessary and proportional. This is meant to set 
a high bar for recognizing a small set of narrowly tailored measures.324 Generally 
speaking, such restrictions should be enacted into formal law through a 
transparent and participatory political process.325 In any case, such laws “must be 
 
 319.  HRC GC 34, supra note 261, ¶ 47 (“Defamation laws must be crafted with care to 
ensure they comply with paragraph 3 and that they do not serve, in practice, to stifle freedom of 
expression.”). 
 320.  See supra note 308 and accompanying text.  
 321.  See HRC GC 34, supra note 261, ¶ 28 (“The term ‘rights’ includes human rights as 
recognized in the [ICCPR] and more generally in international human rights law . . . . The term 
‘others’ relates to other persons individually or as members of a community.”). 
 322.  Id. Obviously this implicates the distinct Article 25 right to vote as well, without 
diminishing the relevance of the political expression that is realized through voting. See 
Shchetko v. Belarus, Communication No. 1009/2001, ¶ 7.4, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/87/D/1009/2001 (July 28, 2006), http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/undocs/1009-
2001.html [https://perma.cc/78SC-GYKP] (“The Committee recalls that under article 25(b), 
every citizen has the right to vote, and that in order to protect this right, States parties to the 
Covenant should prohibit any intimidation or coercion of voters by criminal laws and that such 
laws should be strictly enforced (4). The application of such laws constitutes, in principle, a 
lawful limitation of the right to freedom of expression, necessary for the respect of the rights of 
others.”); Svetik v. Belarus, Communication No. 927/2000, ¶ 7.3, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/81/D/927/2000 (July 30, 2004), http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/undocs/html/927-
2000.html [https://perma.cc/BR6N-VDHF] (stating the same proposition). 
 323.  See Hertzberg v. Finland, Communication No. 61/1979, ¶ 10.3, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/OP/1 (Apr. 2, 1985), https://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/undocs/newscans/61-
1979.html [https://perma.cc/BV6H-TR3G] (recognizing “a certain margin of discretion [that] 
must be accorded to the responsible national authorities” in deciding whether to broadcast 
discussions related to homosexual relations in national media); see also ANDREW LEGG, THE 
MARGIN OF APPRECIATION IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: DEFERENCE AND 
PROPORTIONALITY 41 (Oxford Univ. Press 2012) (“There are no clear cases in the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) and the United Nations Human Rights Committee 
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rights.”); Markus Schmidt, Coming to Grips with Indigenous Rights, 10 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 333, 
338 (1997) (book review) (interpreting HRC decisions as based on the margin of appreciation 
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formulated with sufficient precision to enable an individual to regulate his or her 
conduct accordingly . . . .”326 They must also be accessible to the public.327 In 
addition, to be “necessary,” legally enacted limits must be “directly related to 
[meeting] the specific need on which they are predicated,”328 i.e., they must be 
effective at doing what they are intended to do. A restriction is not indispensable, 
and thus “violates the test of necessity[,] if the protection could be achieved in 
other ways that do not restrict freedom of expression.”329 Finally, any steps taken 
by States to limit expression, even if legitimate and necessary, cannot be 
“overbroad.”330 Proportionate measures are those that are “appropriate to achieve 
their protective function” and “the least intrusive amongst those [available].”331 
In sum, the foregoing sections have clarified the technical grounds upon 
which net neutrality’s formal incorporation into international law as a human 
rights norm are premised. Specifically, I have shown that freedom of expression is 
composed of various constituent norms, several of which react with net 
neutrality. In addition to the “classical” right to impart or access information, the 
right to access the Internet—connectivity—is today essential to the full realization 
of freedom of expression. Moreover, I explained how the non-discrimination 
principles built into human rights law interact with freedom of expression, and 
why they too are natural receptors of net neutrality. Finally, I outlined the 
frameworks that govern when and how States may enact legitimate exceptions to 
freedom of expression and non-discrimination rules. This exposition of the 
exceptions regime under international law explains why neither freedom of 
expression nor non-discrimination norms are entirely exempt from State-
imposed restrictions that advance legitimate State aims, such as the advancement 
or protection of the rights of others. Any such limits, however, must not only be 
enacted in law, but must also be demonstrably necessary and well-tailored to 
achieving the lawful ends identified. 
C.   Why International Human Rights Law? 
Why does it matter that net neutrality is today a consolidated norm of 
international human rights law? With few exceptions, most discussions to date of 
zero-rating have centered on the economic, social, and technical implications of 
allowing or prohibiting such practices in a given country.332 Though some 
attention has been paid to net neutrality as a norm that promotes and protects 
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and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, ¶ 24, U.N. Doc. 
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human rights,333 this perspective has not yet been fully extended to zero-rating. 
As it turns out, re-framing net neutrality and zero-rating as human rights issues 
leads to a range of significant consequences. 
There are a number of substantive and strategic advantages to invoking the 
human rights legal framework in this regard. First, under human rights law, net 
neutrality is defined in human-centric rather than data-centric terms.334 This 
shift is not merely semantic because it portends important implications for that 
norm’s implementation, especially in terms of connectivity. In particular, it means 
that zero-rating practices as transgressions of net neutrality can no longer be 
discussed in all-or-nothing terms. Instead, these practices have to be viewed as 
proposed limits on some people’s freedom of expression (understood as net 
neutrality) intended in substantial part to enhance the freedom of expression 
rights of others (i.e. through expanded access). Second, as explained in the prior 
subpart, this re-framing places net neutrality issues squarely within a universally 
recognized normative framework that imposes clear legal obligations on a 
majority of States.335 Safeguarding net neutrality thus becomes a duty incumbent 
on governments, rather than merely a compelling or controversial policy 
alternative. This ensures that discussions about how to limit net neutrality like 
those taking place in the United States, Europe, Mexico, and a host of other 
countries transpire within the same, universally applicable regime established by 
international law, promoting greater normative consistency across the board.336 
Last but not least, for all the foregoing reasons, the human rights framework 
provides structure and rigor to what often are heated contests of unmoored 
dogma: net neutrality absolutism clashing with the inviolability of the 
marketplace. Evaluating net neutrality regulation as a function of the State’s duties 
under international law opens practical pathways for constructively debating 
zero-rating, because it establishes normative parameters that apply equally to all 
sides engaged in the discussions. People stop talking past each other, and start 
talking to each other. At the same time—and this is critical—the human rights 
approach is the only one that expressly accounts for all the others. Those who 
view net neutrality as a sacred network principle will pay little heed to what the 
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economists and free market advocates say; others who critique net neutrality as a 
malleable priority preference may prioritize competition, consumer choice, or the 
public interest. In other words, the prevailing perspectives—social, economic, 
technical—that characterize the net-neutrality and zero-rating debates do not 
easily accommodate each other, if at all. Very few pay anything more than lip 
service to human rights. 
Human rights law is different: it is the unifying “theory of everything.” All 
other approaches have a place in the normative framework as quantitative and 
qualitative inputs for the analysis of the State’s obligations to promote and protect 
the rights of their people. Data on whether or not zero-rating practices advance or 
hinder meaningful Internet access are integral to the analysis of the necessity of 
the proposed measures. Market studies of the impact of zero-rating practices on 
innovation, competition, and user experience will factor into the analysis of 
whether the zero-rating practices authorized are proportional. Issues of policy are 
folded into the discussion of what constitutes a legitimate aim of States seeking to 
restrict freedom of expression by curtailing net neutrality through differential 
pricing (or other means). As I will show in the final Part, whether one is 
evaluating the legitimacy of the State’s objectives, or the nature of differential 
pricing and its impact on net neutrality, all relevant data—social, economic, 
political, technical—will play a role and be balanced against countervailing factors 
also recognized by the human rights framework. The same cannot be said of any 
other approach. 
IV.   TOWARDS A HUMAN RIGHTS ANALYSIS OF ZERO RATING 
Human rights can be invoked by advocates on all sides of the net neutrality 
and zero-rating debates. Those who defend an essentially unqualified concept of 
net neutrality insist that people’s rights to receive or impart information and ideas 
freely should rarely if ever be compromised (though most admit the need for a 
few exceptions, for example, to reasonably manage the network or protect its 
integrity). They believe that maintaining a near blanket prohibition on any 
differentiation in the handling of Internet traffic, and preserving the purity of the 
“end-to-end” principle, is the best—if not the only—way to truly preserve the 
integrity and unbound potential of the network.337 For these reasons, among 
others, they prefer to seek alternatives to zero-rating in the developing world that 
can advance the laudable goal of increasing full connectivity without sacrificing 
network neutrality. Proponents of zero-rating practices, on the other hand, 
 
 337.  See, e.g., Susan Crawford, Zero for Conduct, BACKCHANNEL (Jan. 7, 2015), 
https://medium.com/backchannel/less-than-zero-199bcb05a868#.e248c9qfz 
[https://perma.cc/SJ9S-N84R] (“The aim of net neutrality is to preserve the Internet as the 
crucial open sidewalk for communication that it has become. The reason that the Chinese, 
Russian and Cuban governments fear open Internet more than anything else is that it allows 
users to gather and speak to one another. . . . Linking and building are fundamental attributes of 
the Internet—innovation and speech without permission—and that must not be compromised 
away.”). 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2746447
Spring 2016         ZERO RATING, NET NEUTRALITY, AND INT’L LAW 419 
frequently justify their position by pointing to the daunting digital divide and the 
imperative to empower the masses of unconnected people living primarily in the 
developing world by any means available. In this more pragmatic view, the ends 
justify the means: the best way to improve the situation of those disenfranchised 
people, they say, is to ensure their right to access at least some of the Internet in 
the first place, as an onramp to fuller Internet access, thus enabling them to 
exercise their freedom of expression and enjoy the benefits of other human rights 
as well, even if that means curtailing net neutrality through zero-rating.338 
As a rule, when advocates for either side make express reference to human 
rights in support of their arguments, those references tend to be cursory at best. 
Even when digital rights advocates invoke human rights more formally, the 
supporting analysis is either lacking or deficient. This Article has addressed such 
normative gaps by clarifying the operation of the applicable human rights legal 
framework; that was the object of Part III. In this final Part, I consider that 
framework in context with reference to the empirical data presented in Part II. In 
particular, I review the key elements of the exceptions regime—legitimate aim, 
necessity, and proportionality—to better illustrate how they would apply in 
country-specific conditions like those described in Part II.B. To achieve this, I 
draw from prior discussion of other key topics, namely the typology of zero-rating 
practices and the barriers to connectivity. This should deepen the understanding 
of how human rights analysis applies to these issues. 
A.   Legitimate Aim 
States are increasingly under pressure to close the global digital divide. The 
United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goals commit States to “[s]ignificantly 
increas[ing] access to information and communications technology and striv[ing] 
to provide universal and affordable access to the Internet in least developed 
countries by 2020.”339 Whether a State’s aim to do so is legitimate or not when 
proposing restrictions on net neutrality, such as differential pricing, will depend 
on that country’s social, economic, and political conditions. States with high levels 
of connectivity, whether wired or mobile or both, will face different challenges 
than those with large percentages of their population on the wrong side of the 
digital divide. Most States in this latter category are developing countries, where 
the vast majority of unconnected people live.340 It is therefore easier for a country 
such as Zambia, where less than twenty percent of its people have Internet access, 
to claim that by promoting zero-rating it is advancing a legitimate State aim, i.e., 
promoting connectivity, than for the United States to do so, given its access rate 
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of nearly ninety percent.341 The key to understanding the legitimate aim element, 
however, is not Internet penetration rates per se, but the barriers to connectivity 
that keep them low in many countries. 
To advance a legitimate aim, a developing country’s zero-rating policies must 
address the principal barriers to connectivity. Primary among these is the 
relatively high cost of accessing data via Internet on wired and mobile platforms. 
One reason Internet access is far greater in developed countries is its relative 
affordability. As a rule, such countries have higher per capita incomes and lower 
inequality rates than developing ones. Wired and mobile penetration rates are 
also high, as more people can afford the necessary hardware and data plans. There 
are few hard barriers to connectivity for most. And there are fewer “soft” barriers 
as well, such as low literacy and education levels, that can keep people off the 
Internet even where access is affordable. In short, the barriers to connectivity are 
simply not as high in developed countries, if they exist at all, as they are in most 
parts of the developing world. It follows that governments in developed countries 
will generally face an uphill battle to justify restricting net neutrality to allow for 
zero-rating as a means of enhancing connectivity.342 
It should be evident by now that generating greater opportunities to connect 
for the digitally disenfranchised sectors of society can substantially advance the 
realization of freedom of expression and other basic human rights in any country 
marked by a significant digital divide.343 The benefits of increasing access in the 
developing world are too well established to bear repeating here. For these 
reasons, zero-rating plans, though discriminatory for economic reasons, might 
still constitute a “legitimate differentiation” under human rights law if they meet 
the other elements of the exceptions regime test.344 Developing States with digital 
divides that choose to promote this goal will likely have a legitimate aim. 
Expanding Internet access is no less essential to realizing freedom of expression 
and other basic human rights than ensuring the general right to impart or receive 
information in a non-discriminatory manner, which is what net neutrality does. 
So the main challenge for most States struggling to bridge their domestic digital 
divide by promoting greater connectivity will be whether the proposed means are 
necessary and proportionate, as well as prescribed by law. 
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B.   Necessity 
Necessity is a factual question. What restrictions are indispensable to tackling 
a recognized problem or challenge in a given context will turn on: (a) the extent 
to which they are effective; (b) the nature of the problem addressed; (c) the 
existence of viable alternatives; and (d) the effectiveness of those alternatives. It is 
important to note that “necessary” does not mean “exclusive,” especially where the 
challenges faced are substantial and/or complex. A related issue is who is best 
positioned to determine when a particular measure is “necessary” to meet the 
objectives sought, and when it is not. For purposes of the ensuing discussion, 
references to “zero-rating practices” will refer to those described in the typology 
presented above in Part II.A. 
There is evidence that zero-rating practices can increase the number of 
people accessing at least parts of the Internet, and sometimes the full Internet, by 
lowering the cost of access.345 “For example, in less than a year, Facebook’s zero-
rating initiative Internet.org . . . won more than 9 million [new] users.”346 
According to Facebook, more than half of these users went on to pay for 
additional access to the Internet within thirty days of joining.347 Certainly a large 
number of governments have bet on this approach being true in practice when 
promoting or condoning zero-rated platforms as a means of promoting 
connectivity, and thereby development.348 Few critics of zero-rating dispute that 
offering reduced cost or free access to some Internet services can work in favor of 
increasing mobile subscriptions and some connectivity. Instead, most critics focus 
their attention on the perceived harms generated by such practices—the creation 
of “walled gardens” for users or the impact on competition—which they claim 
outweigh the potential benefits.349 Regardless, there is no question that more 
empirical research is needed to confirm the circumstances under which zero-
rating practices can be effective in overcoming the crucial barrier of high access 
costs, the extent of that effectiveness, and the countervailing consequences of 
adopting such practices.350 
The very same is true of the faux or non-selective zero-rating practices that 
purport to facilitate public connectivity at reduced cost without offending net 
neutrality, perhaps even more so.351 As of this writing, there is little data or 
analysis available on the impact and effectiveness of zero-rating alternatives as 
such, though important initiatives are underway to change that. For example, 
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Mozilla is researching the effects of its “equal rating” initiatives in the field.352 
Another example is provided by community networking, which advocates say 
expands full connectivity in both rural and urban areas.353 These initiatives, to 
answer the questions posed by the necessity prong of the exceptions regime, 
would have to ascertain the positive and negative consequences for freedom of 
expression of implementing a particular zero-rating alternative in a given local 
context, and comparing those outcomes to similar ones obtained for zero-rated 
practices conducted in the same or similar context. There is no other way to know 
whether zero-rating practices achieve greater, similar, or lesser levels of 
connectivity than those that “could be achieved in other ways that do not restrict 
freedom of expression.”354 
The upshot is that we are a long way from being able to say with any 
certainty that zero-rated connectivity-enhancing approaches are significantly 
more or less effective at closing the digital divide in a particular setting than any of 
the current alternatives. Add to this the sheer magnitude of the social, economic, 
political, and cultural challenges facing States in the developing world that seek to 
establish access to the Internet for their people,355 and it becomes impossible to 
exclude ab initio any presumptively viable approach as unnecessary, even if it 
offends net neutrality. Moreover, there is good reason to believe that the principal 
problem addressed—closing the digital divide in those countries where it is most 
prevalent—is substantial and complex enough to require an amply diversified 
response.356 For these reasons, it is not possible at this point to simply dismiss 
zero-rating practices as unnecessary or dispensable on the grounds that they are 
either not effective enough, or that there are better alternatives available that can 
achieve the same or better results. This means that the most fertile ground for 
critics of zero-rating measures in these situations is that offered by the evaluation 
of proportionality. 
C.   Proportionality 
At the heart of the proportionality element is the balance between advancing 
the legitimate aim identified and the human rights cost of achieving it.357 If a 
proposed restriction on freedom of expression advances such an aim effectively 
enough to be considered necessary, the question becomes whether it has been 
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configured appropriately, such that the positive gains from enacting it outweigh 
the negative consequences sufficiently to justify the curtailment of that underlying 
right. “When assessing the proportionality of a restriction on freedom of 
expression on the Internet, the impact of that restriction on the ability of the 
Internet to deliver positive freedom of expression outcomes must be weighed 
against its benefits in terms of protecting other interests.”358 
In other words, proportionality can only be determined with reference to a 
particular situation and specific circumstances. Exceptions that sweep too broadly 
may threaten to “swallow the rule,”359 while those that deliver minimal or 
negligible benefits will be unlikely to advance a legitimate aim. Finally, for such 
measures to pass muster under this legal standard, they should be the least 
intrusive available to ensure the desired ends.360 If they are not, the balance would 
tip against the legality of such a measure. In sum, once the other elements of the 
exceptions regime are met, whether a proposed zero-rating practice is 
proportionate or not is a factual question of relative balance between its pros and 
cons.361 
There are several factors to keep in mind when engaging in the balancing 
analysis of proportionality, which is where much if not most of the zero-rating 
debate in the developing world should focus. General factors include the type of 
zero-rating practice at issue, its particular configuration, and the perceived 
benefits it can bring in relation to the legitimate aim sought;362 the nature of the 
Internet access and content provided; the existence and comparable effectiveness 
of non-net neutrality offending alternatives; and any other negative consequences 
of that zero-rating practice on users’ enjoyment of their basic human rights.363 
The Center for Democracy and Technology has developed a complementary 
framework of more specific factors that serve to better identify “the potential 
benefits and harms” of particular zero-rating arrangements.364 These include the 
principle of non-exclusivity, a presumption against sponsored data plans, 
attention to privacy and data security, providing technical assistance and training 
in local markets, transparency and regulation.365 The function of this framework 
can be summarized as follows: 
 With respect to edge providers, the overriding concern is the potential for 
market distortion as edge providers are either excluded from preferential 
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arrangements or coerced to modify their content and services to benefit from 
them. Thus, whether arrangements are exclusive (particularly exclusive to 
affiliates of the network operator), sponsored, or limited to particular sources or 
types of content and applications are all highly relevant considerations. For users, 
the ability to maintain the control of the content and services they access or 
create via the Internet is the overriding consideration. User choice in selecting 
zero-rated content, the availability and cost of metered content, and the 
transparency of zero-rating arrangements are significant factors in determining 
whether zero rating can spur broadband adoption and access to the open 
Internet. Finally, whether zero rating will serve as an on-ramp to “full” Internet 
access or a roundabout of curated offerings that users exit only at great effort and 
expense, if at all, depends on some fundamental attributes of the broadband 
market: existing levels of adoption and deployment, competition, and digital 
literacy and education.366 
To understand how such factors operate, we must examine them in context. 
Take the example of Zambia, profiled in Part II.B.3. One of the principal 
criticisms of the Internet.org/Free Basics platform operating in Zambia, a 
compound zero-rating practice, has been that it offers only limited access to 
certain select sites and services on the Internet as curated by Facebook (in 
partnership with Airtel, the local telecom), creating an Internet “for poor 
people.”367 Critics say that, in addition to violating net neutrality in principle, this 
model of compound zero-rating creates an invidious “walled-garden,” which is 
“absolutely inappropriate” because it “creates a synthetic ‘online’ experience for 
users that isn’t the Internet.”368 They claim, moreover, that in developing 
countries like Zambia, zero-rating platforms such as Internet.org/Free Basics can 
have prejudicial economic consequences by “empower[ing] market concentration, 
restrict[ing] local innovation and . . . reduc[ing] user choices.”369 All these 
compelling concerns can be placed on the “negative and potentially negative 
consequences” side of the proportionality scale. But they must be contrasted and 
weighed against the countervailing “positive and potentially positive 
consequences” on the other. 
And there are palpable benefits to consider. According to Facebook, a year 
after the roll-out of Internet.org in Zambia, with its emphasis on granting access 
to a range of basic services sites of interest to the public,370 the goal of increased 
connectivity had been substantially advanced, there and elsewhere: 
Internet.org brings new users onto mobile networks on average over 50% faster 
after launching free basic services [than before they were launched], and more 
than half of the people who come online through Internet.org are paying for data 
and accessing the internet within the first 30 days. These points show that 
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Internet.org is not only a successful tool in helping bring people online, but it is 
successful in showing people the value of the internet and helping to accelerate 
its adoption.371 
Facebook is not the only one saying that zero-rating platforms like 
Internet.org can have positive effects on increased connectivity rates,372 or that 
they may not be as harmful to innovation, competition and user choice as the 
naysayers claim.373 And while access is limited to a suite of selected sites offering 
free basic services, these services have been geared towards local needs and 
content.374 It can also be noted that, in response to concerns about Internet.org’s 
impact on local competition and innovation, Facebook made changes to the 
platform’s specifications to make it non-exclusive and more accessible to service 
providers and application designers, in order “to work with as many mobile 
operators and developers as possible to extend the benefits of connectivity to 
diverse, local communities around the world.”375 This was intended to reduce the 
harm to competition and innovation that a closed platform would have. 
The balancing of pros and cons required by proportionality can only be 
carried out in relation to the underlying problem addressed and the obstacles to 
resolving it. In the case of Zambia (and other developing countries), this means 
the domestic digital divide and barriers to connectivity. Despite improvement in 
recent years, Zambia is still ranked by the United Nations as one of the “least-
developed” countries in the world.376 Internet penetration rates are dismal: less 
than two percent of the population has wired Internet access at home, and it is 
unlikely that the hard barriers to increased connectivity will allow for much 
improvement on that front. On the other hand, the total number of Internet users 
is around fifteen percent, thanks to much higher mobile phone coverage among 
the population. Even so, there is a substantial gap between that fifteen percent, 
and the sixty-seven percent that have mobile phones generally, suggesting an 
opportunity to narrow the divide by promoting greater mobile connectivity.377 
This is where the compound zero-rating platform Internet.org/Free basics has 
stepped in. 
In the Zambian context, it is therefore possible to argue from a human rights 
law perspective that, in light of the country’s deep connectivity crisis, the benefits 
in terms of increased access offered by Internet.org/Free Basics, although limited 
to select services, still outweigh the disadvantages of that zero-rating practice, 
making it an appropriate, and thus proportional, measure under the 
 
 371.  One Year In, supra note 49; see also Facebook’s Internet.org App Offers Free Internet 
Access in Zambia, BGR (Aug. 18, 2014), http://www.bgr.in/news/facebooks-internet-org-app-
offers-free-internet-access-in-zambia [https://perma.cc/A2AL-EKV9]. 
 372.  See supra note 345 and accompanying text. 
 373.  Layton & Elaluf-Calderwood, supra note 23, at 28-32. 
 374.  See supra note 183 and accompanying text. 
 375.  See One Year In, supra note 49. 
 376.  See supra notes 125-129 and accompanying text (discussing the United Nations 
current LDC criteria and list). 
 377.  See supra notes 122 & 185 and accompanying text. 
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circumstances. This argument is premised on an acceptance that the 
Internet.org/Free Basics platform increases access among the digitally 
disenfranchised in Zambia, and benefits them in meaningfully relevant ways, 
despite not immediately offering the full Internet to everyone who subscribes. On 
this view, some Internet, with the possibility of more Internet, is still better than 
no Internet at all, at least for the time being.378 Both hard and soft barriers to 
connectivity are surmounted, as both the numbers of users and their online 
experience increase.379 Facebook’s efforts to optimize the openness of the 
platform have also lessened the negative impact of curtailing net neutrality. And, 
crucially, an advocate claiming that Internet.org/Free Basics is a proportional 
restriction on net neutrality in Zambia can credibly argue that no better, less 
intrusive alternatives to that type of compound zero-rated platform currently 
exist. If these premises hold, the pro-human rights argument in support of 
Internet.org/Free Basics in Zambia, and other developing countries like it, is 
incontrovertible. 
D.   Zero-Rating in Context 
The foregoing subparts underscore the importance of evaluating net 
neutrality and its zero-rated exceptions in context. The situation in Zambia 
reflects one pole of the human rights spectrum of analysis because it qualifies as a 
“Least Developed Country” with high barriers to connectivity. For the reasons 
discussed above, Zambia is most likely complying more effectively with its 
international human rights obligations by permitting zero-rating practices than it 
would be by banning them. On the other end of that spectrum are developed 
countries like the Netherlands and the United States, which ban and partially 
allow zero-rating, respectively. In those countries, both home and mobile Internet 
access is affordable and ubiquitous.380 Net neutrality protections are strong, and 
exceptions narrowly defined, at least in the case of the Netherlands.381 In that 
country, there are few barriers to connectivity as a practical matter, so any 
rationale to support imposing restrictions on net neutrality must be grounded in 
some other aim recognizable as legitimate, in addition to the requirement that the 
 
 378.  This is not an uncommon view in developing countries. See Liezel Hill & Andres R. 
Martinez, Kenya Says That Access Trumps ‘First World’ Problem of Net Neutrality, 
BLOOMBERG BUSINESS (Feb. 24, 2016, 8:54 AM EST), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-02-24/kenya-says-access-trumps-first-world-
issue-of-net-neutrality [https://perma.cc/CU6Y-EZ7X]. 
 379.  The Kenyan Minister of Information, Communications and Technology Joe 
Mucheru observes that “people who don’t have any access to the Internet often don’t 
understand its value. Access to services like Free Basics brings that awareness, and they’re often 
then willing to pay to get access to more tools and information.” Id. 
 380.  See supra notes 228-244 and accompanying text; see also David Mayer, Dutch and 
Slovenian Regulators Nail Carriers over Net Neutrality, GIGAOM (Jan. 27, 2015, 3:04 AM CDT), 
https://gigaom.com/2015/01/27/dutch-and-slovenian-regulators-nail-carriers-over-net-
neutrality [https://perma.cc/B2U2-HMXQ]. 
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means be necessary and proportionate to achieve that legitimate aim. Thus, for 
example, reasonable measures for Internet traffic management that impinge on 
net neutrality are nonetheless accepted (like in most countries) as a justified 
because they are necessary, proportionate, and limited in time.382 In short, the 
Netherlands is most likely complying more effectively with its international 
human rights obligations by prohibiting zero-rating than by permitting it.  
Still unclear is how the United States’ new rules allowing for “sponsored data” 
will be interpreted by the FCC.383 When are sponsored data or zero-rated plans 
not based on “unfair” or “unreasonable” discrimination in contravention of net 
neutrality? Past FCC practice supports the claim made by some experts that 
limited exceptions to pricing controls with clear public interest or consumer 
benefits may survive the FCC’s case-by-case scrutiny where little or no negative 
impact on competition or consumer choice is perceived.384 A different question is 
whether such plans would survive a human rights analysis.385 
Then there is the middle ground between the two poles. States like Slovenia 
and Chile, which manifest features of both developing and developed countries, 
make for harder cases.386 Here, the analysis required by international human 
rights law is more complicated because, among other reasons, the factors to 
balance tend to even out. For example, Chile enjoys relatively high levels of 
Internet access and affordability leading to substantial penetration rates, though 
not as high as those in developed countries like the Netherlands, which bans zero-
rating more categorically.387 Some barriers to connectivity remain, though they 
are lower than those found in most developing countries. Even so, inequality 
levels in Chile are high, and significant sectors of its society remain 
unconnected.388 The telecoms sector is privatized and highly competitive, 
expanding consumer choices. It is thus difficult to say whether zero-rating 
practices, to the extent they are being permitted in Chile, could be justifiable 
 
 382.  See Council of Europe Gets Tough on Net Neutrality, supra note 20. 
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under the human rights regime without looking at them on a case-by-case basis in 
light of the framework outlined above. The point here is not to offer a definitive 
statement of Chile’s (or any other country’s) compliance with its human rights 
obligations. Rather, the idea is to illustrate how a more rigorous analytical 
framework can be applied to such policy questions to enhance their constructive 
consideration. This “new” perspective on net neutrality and zero-rating similarly 
lays the groundwork for deeper normative research and consideration of these 
issues. 
V.   CONCLUSION: HAVING YOUR CAKE AND EATING IT TOO 
It turns out that, under certain circumstances, zero-rating can be compatible 
with net neutrality understood as a norm of human rights. In other words: 
sometimes, you can have your cake and eat it too. But that normative reality does 
not, in itself, respond to the underlying question of when the requisite conditions 
are met in a given country, or by which particular zero-rating arrangements, so as 
to justify the practice in this way. For that, one must engage with the human 
rights law framework as outlined and developed above. In the Introduction, I 
invoked the contentious net neutrality debates in India during 2015 to illustrate 
the zero-rating conundrum in action. Despite some progress, India continues to 
be an ideal case study of the challenges involved in regulating net neutrality 
effectively. 
The initial question provocatively posed in the Introduction was whether 
Facebook in India could “have its cake and eat it too” by promoting its zero-rated 
Internet.org/Free Basics platform while simultaneously holding itself out as a 
champion of net neutrality. India’s regulator decided in February 2016 that it 
could not by banning all differential pricing by telecoms, thereby pulling the plug 
on Internet.org/Free Basics and similar offerings.389 Surprisingly, however, the 
Indian regulator soon thereafter executed an embarrassing “flip-flop” by issuing 
two new net neutrality-related consultations,390 which advocates believe threaten 
to reintroduce zero-rating “through the back door.”391 If nothing else, this 
“confused” approach to regulating net neutrality in general, and zero-rating in 
particular, confirms that the question of what arrangements might constitute 
acceptable restrictions on net neutrality in the Indian context has yet to be 
decided.392 It also means that India continues to struggle with the zero-rating 
conundrum.  
A better way of reformulating the initial question posed is whether India, in 
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deciding to prohibit differential pricing and private sector zero-rating, is 
maximizing the enjoyment by its people of basic human rights like freedom of 
expression, and thus adequately complying with its international human rights 
obligations. Based on the international law framework outlined in prior Parts and 
India’s yawning digital divide,393 the answer is probably no. This “new” 
perspective supports the position that by reframing the debate on net neutrality in 
human rights terms, regulators and advocates in India and elsewhere would gain a 
more consistent and comprehensive approach to evaluating the issues. This, in 
turn, would foster more constructive debates and, ultimately, better policymaking. 
The Indian regulators’ recent volte-face might just signal an opportunity to 
reevaluate India’s position in those terms.  
 
 
 
 
393. See supra Table 2. (indicating that in India, less than twenty percent of the population 
has Internet access of any kind). 
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